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The Place of Feeling in Conduct in Indian Philosophy.

Samkhya-Yoga.

By

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In considering the part played by "Feeling" in the sphere of human conduct, we would do well to bear in mind at the very outset that "Feeling" is to be understood not as mere "pleasure-pain," the agreeable-disagreeable elements of consciousness, but as embracing all degrees and shades of concrete emotion, like joy, sorrow, pity, sympathy, satisfaction and discontent. The terms 'sukha' and 'duḥkha' in Indian Philosophy are invariably used in this concrete sense, and not merely as meaning mere 'pleasantness' and 'unpleasantness.' Therefore, we shall consider the place and value of emotional consciousness in conduct, and not merely the part played by 'feeling' in the elementary sense, in determining action, as some Hedonists have done.

It is a general rule of conduct that pleasure determines appetite, and pain determines aversion; 'appetition,' and 'aversion' meaning any action making for or against the continuance or repetition of any kind of experience. The principle is of very wide application in the conduct of animals and young children. In the absence of intelligence and of purposive selection, subjective or hedonic selection holds exclusive sway in regulating conduct and in bringing about new adjustments. It is by generalising this principle and making it applicable to all human conduct that Hedonism arrives at the conclusion that the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain are

the sole motives of human conduct. In the absence of organised interest, feeling is the only light available for the guidance of conduct. But it is questionable if it is so in the organised life of grown-up man. Man does not give up what he is bent on achieving simply because he feels pain on the way, or pursue a course of action only because he finds pleasure in it. With all men, both good and bad, pleasure and pain become more and more mere incidents as life advances, colouring and punctuating all actions, but not always determining or directing them.

The exaggerated value assigned to feeling in Hedonistic psychology and ethics is due to a confusion between 'feeling' as mere pleasure-pain and feeling in the sense of 'emotion'. Feeling in the former sense is primitive, non-complex, and incapable of development. Mere pleasure-pain is the same in men and animals, in old age and infancy. Emotions on the other hand, are highly complex and varied in their nature, undergoing considerable modifications in the course of experience. They form an important part of our inner life, and profoundly influence our conduct, both good and bad. Men are widely separated in their intellectual capacities and practical interests, but the same emotional nature knits not only all men, but all sentient creation, into one kind; and the doctrine of Ahimsā, not a mere negative injunction to refrain from injury of sentient creatures, but active sympathy, *karuṇā*, fellow-feeling, and love to all living things is based on this oneness of nature so far as our capacity to feel, suffer and enjoy is concerned. Feeling and emotion are more deep-seated than intellect and will, that is why the *Taittirīya-Upanishad* makes *Ānandamaya* the innermost *Kōśa* or vestment of the self. When our feelings are roused, or the emotions disturbed, we are far more profoundly, deeply, and widely affected than when our minds are excited in other directions; and if we can become emotionally unaesthetic

and thereby excluded from the life of feeling, harsh as well as tender, the primary value of life and its chief main-spring would be withdrawn.

The primary emotions which are a part of our constitution undergo considerable modification in the course of life and experience. In civilized life we learn to control and modify the typical bodily symptoms of our mental states ; in general the expressive movements getting reduced as one grows older, and more educated and cultured. Organisation marks the development of mental life in all its aspects. As simple sensations are built up into the complex structure of our knowledge, and as the primitive impulses and reflexes are organised into a coherent system of purposes in the sphere of conduct, so our primary feelings and emotions, divested of their grosser bodily features, are organised round the various objects that excite them. Such is the nature of friendship and love, patriotism and religious devotion. If we did not possess a deep affective and emotional nature, we would be incapable of these fine sentiments ; and who can deny their supreme value in the sphere of conduct and as the main-springs of most of our actions ?

Another way of looking at the thing is to regard the whole process of mental development as one of Substitution or Sublimation. The finer emotions which are the main-stay of all Art, Poetry, Music, Religion and Morals, are the result of such a development. Gandhi's Satyāgraha as a moral motive is nothing but a toned-down form of anger. And 'love of God' is nothing but an etherialised form of the gross passion of love with which every living being is endowed. If man did not possess a deep-seated affective and emotional nature, he would be incapable of finer emotions, and incapable of the higher life of art, morality and religion, of which the finer emotions are the mainstay.

While European philosophers generally regard the mind as soul, taking feeling and the emotions together with 'intellect' and 'will' as part of the inherent constitution of the self, Indian philosophy is more thorough-going in its analysis; and regards the entire mind with its equipment of intellectual and other faculties as part of the not-self; the Self, Purusha or Ātman being only the conscious subject or experient. In this Sāṅkhya and Vedānta almost entirely agree, differing from the Vaiśeṣika school who regard knowledge, pleasure, pain etc. as *guṇas* or attributes of the self. All action and agency belong to the not-self; the Ātman being only a witness, perceiver, or experient of everything that takes place. In the Sāṅkhya analysis of Reality, we have two contrasted or opposed entities; viz. Purusha and Prakriti; and all activity belongs to the latter only. Prakriti is not mere matter or mass; but essentially energy. It is dynamic in its constitution, being nothing but the concrete manifestation of the different varieties of action or force represented by the three *Guṇas* of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. The *Guṇas* are not 'qualities' or attributes of anything, but constituents of Prakriti and her products. Everything in the phenomenal or object-world is determined by the combined influence of the three *guṇas* acting together or severally. Spirit is entirely free from the *guṇas* and their effects, being purely passive and inactive in essence. Sattva, rajas and tamas represent Prakriti in one or another of her aspects which have become predominant for the time being. They are the essential conditions of all existing things except spirit; and inseparable from the things themselves. *Sattva* accounts for pleasure, modesty, satisfaction, rectitude, wisdom, clemency, in everything—whatever is elevating, soothing efficient and smooth-working in objects. *Rajas* when predominant gives rise to pain, energy, change, motion, sorrow, trouble, enmity, violence, abuse, envy, cruelty—all that is exciting, disturbing, impelling or stimulating in things. *Tamas*

is responsible for all confusion, rest, retardation, inhibition, inertia, darkness, ignorance, sleep, fear, timidity, infidelity, dishonesty, avarice, insensibility, laziness, stupidity, downward tendency, in all objects. *Sattva* and *Tamas* by themselves are not active forces, *Rajas* being the sole disturbing or dynamic factor that accounts for all changes in phenomena. Unless influenced by *Rajas*, *Sattva* leads to peace, joy, quietude, equanimity and equilibrium and *Tamas* to stagnation, inertia, weakness, lassitude and resistance. Only when combined with *Rajas*, *Sattva* and *Tamas* exhibit their respective influences for good or evil. The three *guṇas* never act singly, but always in combination with each other. They are intermingled in every thing and everywhere; and the nature of each *guṇa* is modified by its combination with the others. The three *guṇas* so different in their effects, and often opposed to one another—in their tendencies and results, cooperate in achieving a common object, like the oil, wick and flame in a lamp combining to give heat and light. This common object is the life and liberty of spirit. The diversity and modification in what is originally uniform and homogeneous, viz, the *avyakta*, are brought about by the different influences of the three *guṇas* that form the essential constituents of *Prakṛiti*. To bring about change, modification or evolution is the fundamental nature of the *guṇas* which can never be at rest, and owing to their incessant activity arises their combination in different proportions, or their preponderance over one another in different objects; and this accounts for the evolution of *Prakṛiti* which gives rise to the world-process or *samsāra*.

Regarded from the subjective or affective point of view, *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* are nothing but *Sukha*, *duḥkha* and *moha*, respectively. But these are not characteristics of *puruṣa*, but only of the object—not-self; and spirit is made subject to them through his erroneous identification with what is not his true self, and through ignorance of his own

true nature. In Sāṅkhya-Yoga what we are accustomed to regard as subjective and objective from the European point of view, the inner and outer aspects of things, do not form two different orders of things entirely different in kind, as in Descartes ; but they proceed from one and the same source. Consequently, the Ego and the material world do not differ altogether in nature from one another, both being products of the three guṇas. What appears from within as the world of ideas appears outside as the world of matter. In the outer world we have all the grounds of our inner experiences, cognitive, emotional and conative. The changes of the external world are translated into our ideas and feelings. Thus, the tanmātras are spoken of as endowed with feelings. They are the subtle essences that issue from Mūla-Prakṛiti in its third stage of evolution. They are not mere atoms of matter like the Vaiśeṣika Paramāṇus ; but contain within themselves particular qualities in virtue of which they appear as pleasant, unpleasant or passive to us. All states of the mind are due to the operation of the three guṇas, every state involving all the guṇas, whose effects are opposed to one another. Their contrariety becomes marked with the development of mental life ; when the guṇas abide in different proportions in all the mental states.

Sāṅkhya-Yoga, like all other schools of Indian Philosophy is essentially practical in outlook and aim. Philosophy in India is not mere speculation undertaken to satisfy the theoretic curiosity of the mind as to the nature of Reality in general, but is the result of an attempt to solve the problems of life. This problem is always conceived as a problem of evil. Life or Samsāra is full of evil, pain, sorrow and misery ; and unless one realises this and desires to free himself from the essential and inherent evils of worldly life ; that is, unless one possesses both Vairāgya and Mumukshutva, one is not fit to undertake philosophical studies or qualified to succeed in

his undertaking. From this point of view the Sāṅkhya is more metaphysical than the Yoga which is solely interested in the practical ways of attaining the goal of final emancipation.

The *Summum bonum* the ultimate aim of all philosophical endeavour, the supreme Purushatva of life, is Kai-valya, moksha, or freedom from all kinds of sin, suffering and evil to which all worldly life is subject ; and in Sāṅkhya, this freedom is to be attained by separating oneself from the operations of Prakṛiti and her guṇas. Kapila, out of his supreme wisdom and mercy, taught the world the ways of prakṛiti in subjecting mankind to her three-fold bonds in order to reveal to men the only means of freeing themselves from her bonds ; for, though her workings are eternal, when once her nature is fully understood and she has been truly known by the enlightenend individual, Prakṛiti ceases her operations so far as he is concerned. She unwinds and withdraws her bonds and finally disappears from his view. The *Sāṅkhya-kārikas* begin by setting forth the threefold nature of evil that besets all life and its ineradicability by the ordinary means known in worldly experience.

The three kinds of suffering are 1. Ādhyātmika, intrinsic or individual and subjective 2. Ādhibhautika, extrinsic, or natural and objective and 3. Ādhi-Daivika, supernatural. To the first class belong all troubles arising in one's own body or mind ; illness, sorrow, disappointment etc., one's worries and yearnings, follies, negligence, diseases and accidents. The second class arise from external causes, from men and animals, climate and other environmental factors. The third class have their source beyond the realm of ordinary nature, to unseen forces, like earthquakes, pestilences, etc.

The complete freedom of the individual from all suffering can be achieved only by a knowledge of that Reality

which is the source of these evils ; and this the Sāṅkhya professes to teach. It is ignorance of the external nature that surrounds us that is the true cause of all suffering ; and philosophical study alone can remove this ignorance. Worldly enjoyment (*bhoga*), wealth (*Artha*), and religious merit (*Dharma*), are only relative goods—mere means to some other good. *Kaivalya*, or final release from all evil and suffering, is the only thing of ultimate value (*Parama Purushārtha*). Therefore, it ought to be the chief concern of the intelligent man. Indian philosophy starts by stating the problem of life as one of evil only to find a solution for the problem. *Moksha* or *Kaivalya* is always conceived as a condition that is entirely free from all evil, pain and suffering. It is a positive state of everlasting freedom and happiness ; and there is no pessimism in this.

The Sāṅkhya conception of spirit and its relation to Prakriti is vital to the whole scheme of Sāṅkhya-Ethics and salvation. Spirit is a distinct category standing over against the unconscious, un-intelligent Prakriti and her products that constitute the visible and invisible external world. The latter is a vast system of causes and effects, orderly and purposive, of endless adaptation of means and ends, but entirely unconscious ; therefore, presupposing a conscious agent and experient. Prakriti and her effects exist only for the life and enjoyment (*bhoga*) of spirit, who alone is capable of apprehending pleasure and pain. Spirit is different from Prakriti in being devoid of the *guṇas* ; and he is not an aggregate or compound, like Prakriti, but single, simple, one and indivisible. His unity and simplicity are due to his possessing the only attribute of consciousness (*Chit-Chetanā*). Spirit is nothing but pure consciousness, everything else that belongs to our inner nature according to psychology being assigned in Sāṅkhya to one or other of Prakriti's products. Spirit is the agent, director, or controller of the forces of Prakriti—as in

the world, cars etc., do not steer themselves of their own accord, but require an intelligent driver or pilot to direct and regulate their movements, so blind nature requires conscious spirit to guide her processes and functions. Spirit is the sole experient (bhoktā) knower, possessor, perceiver and enjoyer of everything that exists and takes place. Everything exists and takes place for his sake ; they being incomplete and meaningless without him.

Prakriti's purpose in undergoing evolution and unfolding the world-process is twofold; viz., to provide both for the worldly life (bhoga) of spirit, and also for his final release and separation from that life (apavarga-Kaivalya). The latter is the final or ultimate purpose of all the evolutionary processes undergone by Prakriti. It cannot be the salvation of Nature or her products—they do not require to be saved or freed from anything. The salvation of Spirit alone is the outcome and supreme end of all natural processes.

Beside the fact that spirit according to Sāṅkhya is entirely devoid of, and unaffected by the three guṇas, we must note that he is a *Viveki*; or possesses, the capacity to discriminate the real from the unreal; he is the permanent subject or knower. Prakriti and her products being always *Vishayas* or objects—things to be known, possessed or enjoyed by someone else. Spirit also possesses individuality; he is a thing-in-himself, self-existing, and an end-to-himself; whereas Prakriti and her products are common (*sāmānya*); not the exclusive objects of any one particular person; but of all living beings. Finally, spirit does not cause or produce anything. While Sāṅkhya, like Vedānta, regards spirit as infinite in magnitude (*vibhu*), it differs from the latter in believing in a plurality of spirits. It is a consequence of his being devoid of the guṇas that spirit is only a witness or perceiver (*Sākshī*); he is entirely passive and not active—being the passive spectator of all the changes

and actions that take place in the outer world ; himself inactive and unchanging, spirit does not mix or compound with anything. Like the umpire in a game, he does not take part in any activity, standing neutral and indifferent to all phenomenal interplay, never entering into or taking part in the fray that always goes on around him.

It is an important Sāṅkhya doctrine that spirit cannot act (*akartā*), and cannot be an agent, that he never acts, or prompts anything ; Prakṛiti being the sole source of all activity and change. Then, how to account for our desires and volitions from which spring all our joys and sorrows ?—this mixed life of *samsāra* ? The Sāṅkhya answer is that the common belief that spirit wills and acts is due to the confusion between self and not-self, due to the erroneous transfer of the attributes of Prakṛiti and puruṣa to each other. To regard spirit as active, or as undergoing changes like birth, growth, disease and death is a popular error due to this confusion ; like regarding the mind and its faculties to be conscious is an error of European Psychology due to the same confusion. This erroneous transfer of each others' attributes and the consequent confusion and false beliefs (*adhyāsa* and *aviveka*) are due to the very close and intimate association of spirit and Prakṛiti in worldly life, and so long as one is subject to them, suffering and evil are inevitable ; and the inquiry into right knowledge is undertaken in Sāṅkhya in order to teach mankind *Viveka* or the knowledge as to what really belongs to Spirit and Nature respectively, and what their true natures are. In this lies the true road to one's salvation.

Spirit and Nature can never properly unite with one another. Their relation is only one of proximity. The apparent agency of Spirit and his false transference of the attributes of body and mind to himself are due to his proximity or close association, but not the union, with Prakṛiti. " I am aware " is the only statement that spirit can make truly of himself.

When he further says, "I will," "I wish," "I desire," or "I do" this or that, he is making a serious mistake.

The mixed life of Samsāra (bhoga) that Nature affords spirit is the necessary experience and discipline that the latter has to undergo; the bitter fruit, the taste of which makes him long for freedom from worldly life, like an old reprobate that has tired of the company of bawds. It is the same Prakriti that binds and enslaves spirit that can teach him wisdom also. As the former needs the latter to know and enjoy her beauty and make-up, so the latter needs her to teach him the way of right knowledge and resignation. Spirit's purification and elevation can take place only by first contemplating the drama of creation, and after taking part in the life of joy and misery. Prakriti alone affords the proper field of experience for spirit. The latter has first no knowledge of good or evil. It is only after passing through the fire of worldly experience, and after tasting the sweet and bitter fruits of Samsāra that he is rendered fit for Kaivalya or final emancipation. It is only after having had his fill of sensuous experiences, thereby realising the true value of non-spiritual things, that he realises that they are not worth having; and is finally led to return to his true nature and realize his true self.

We have seen that the Pessimism of Sāṅkhya is an initial and not final one. However full of evil life may be, it can be overcome finally and completely; and philosophical wisdom or Viveka is the sole means of final emancipation. It is only a knowledge of the true nature of oneself and of the Nature that surrounds us that can afford us the real means of overcoming all evil and finding ever-lasting peace and happiness.

The Sāṅkhya, in common with other Indian systems, supports the doctrines of Karma and transmigration of souls. It is based on an ethical view of the universe—that of one eternal and universal law of Dharma, justice or righteousness,

governing the whole universe of mental, moral and physical orders.

In accordance with this conception, birth and death are only stages in the eternal migration of the soul—*samsāra*. The individual passes from birth to birth taking various shapes and forms, as an actor puts on different garbs to act different parts, in accordance with his good or bad karma. What abides in the individual, bringing about these temporary external manifestations of bodily life are the Bhāvas; subtle invisible changes worked into the subtle body by one's actions good or bad. They consist in virtue, knowledge, resignation and power, and their opposites, vice, ignorance, attachment and weakness; and they constitute a set of conditions that have their origin in the changes or states of the intellect.

While the Bhāvas themselves exist only as subtle or invisible modifications of the inner body, the consequences of virtue, vice, etc., can only be felt and shown in a bodily state, and require a physical frame and natural environment for the exercise of the intellectual and other functions, as well as for affording the self full scope for experience in accordance with his Bhāvas. Thus, virtue, vice, etc., produce appropriate bodily conditions; the latter produce acts of virtue, vice, etc.—these, fresh bhāvas and fresh bodily states, and so on, in a never-ending cycle, neither the bhāva, nor the bodily states being the origin or the end of the series.

What is the escape from this eternal round of causes and effects, this continuous and never-ending stream of life? Right knowledge (*viveka*) is one of the effects of good karma; one of the bhāvas; and *viveka* is the sole means of liberation in Sāṅkhya as in Vedānta. When spirit is possessed of Right knowledge, the subtle body dissolves into its elements. With the dissolution of the subtle-body, the dispositions of the intellect, the Bhāvas, which are the seeds of future births, terminate. When a spirit has reached this stage, *Prakriti*, so far

as he is concerned undergoes a process of involution, or *Prakriti-laya*.

The Sāṅkhya teaches us the knowledge of the 25 *Tattvas* that constitute reality in order that we may rid ourselves of the threefold evil that besets all life. It is the union of Spirit with the organs and organisms that Nature prepares for him which constitutes his bondage and the cause of all his suffering. Final freedom from all evil lies therefore in the severance of spirit and Nature, in the dissolution of all the natural bonds and envelopments imposed on spirit by Prakriti; like the intellect and the sense-organs. Spirit is bound to experience unhappiness of all sorts till his embodied existence or individuality ceases altogether. Evil and suffering are inherent in all bodily life and worldly existence. Spirit's own nature does not contain anything evil, any sin, pain, or suffering. He is nothing but pure thought or consciousness (*chit*). Bondage and suffering are entirely foreign to his nature. Birth, disease and death have their locus only in matter—in the not-self. But, matter being unconscious, does not experience them. Therefore, it is only by a false transference to himself of what does not properly belong to himself that spirit comes to think that he is bound, that he acts, enjoys, or suffers. It is the aim of Sāṅkhya philosophy to remove this basic ignorance of mankind, the root-cause of all sin and suffering.

Spirit's experience of pain, pleasure, etc., is due to his association with the intellect and other products of Prakriti. Decay, death and suffering are the inevitable concomitants of the latter. Suffering and evil are inseparable from bodily connection; and when spirit is separated from body (and mind), all susceptibility for suffering ceases.

Kaivalya or freedom is something inherent to the proper being of Purusha. Spirit is eternally free. If freedom is a

state to be achieved by some means, like the grace of God, it cannot be ever-lasting. The ordinary view that bondage and suffering belong to spirit is due to a confusion between Nature and spirit. Spirit can be said to be bound only in a relative, and not in an absolute sense. It is only Prakriti that evolves, gets bound by her own *gunas*, migrates from one form to another (*samsāra*) and unbinds herself by a process of involution. Spirit is only the passive spectator of the whole show.

Kaivalya is the termination of all finitude and individuality, the consciousness that one is different from others and opposed in interest to them. It is the realisation of the ideal of *abheda*, absolute equality and non-difference among all sentient beings. In it, one realises "I am not"; and that "nothing is mine". The individualised self, circumscribed by *Ahamkāra* has dropped out; and the self-regarding sentiments, self approbation, pride, envy and emulation, passion and suffering are rendered impossible in this state. When one has disowned all agency and proprietorship, there is no limitation and bondage of any kind.

According to Sāṅkhya, the following are the characteristics of a released spirit :—1. He is a mere spectator; no longer imagining that he is a participant in the drama of life. 2. He is at leisure; quite free of all passions and affections, and with nothing to gain or to achieve. 3. He has nothing to do, having attained the *summum bonum*. 4. He is quite at ease; perfectly happy, as he is no more subject to the three-fold ills of life. When spirit has reached such a state, Nature has no further use for her finery and make-up; therefore, she discards them; puts an end to her productive functions; withdraws her sevenfold attractions or intellectual creations, leaving behind only the one that does not bind. She completely effaces herself by withdrawing herself from

the liberated spirit's view. Spirit is indifferent saying; "I have seen her"; and Nature desists saying, "He has seen me"; and there is no purpose to be served by their union hereafter. In these words, the Sāṅkhya describes the final separation of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, whose union is responsible for life and death, happiness and sorrow, and the ever-recurring processes of creation and destruction of the world. None of them have meaning or purpose after the divorce of Spirit from Nature.

The moment spirit attains right knowledge, he really becomes free; but Nature does not drop out altogether simultaneously. Though freed from Nature's bonds, spirit has to continue his embodied state till the end of his Natural life. The Bhāvas that gave him the bodily frame at the commencement of his present life continue to operate, and the present bodily life must be lived out to its natural termination, like a top that has been set spinning. Causes that have already commenced to operate cannot be put a stop to in the middle. This is the condition of *Jīvan-Mukti*; in which the Sāṅkhya believes as well as Vedānta. "Free yet alive", the *Jīvan-Mukta* appears to live and move like others; but he is really free and unattached to his medium and its vicissitudes; and he becomes altogether free at the end of his natural life. Such a state is transcendental, being unlike anything in ordinary life and experience; and cannot be described in terms of anything with which we are familiar.

In adjudging the place of feeling, it is better to take the *Jīvan-Mukti* state rather than the *Mukti* state. The latter is transcendental, and beyond experience. But the former constitutes the ethical and spiritual ideal, the goal of philosophical theory and practice. What place have feeling and the emotions in this state? They have a place in it according to Vedānta; but not according to Sāṅkhya. Ānanda

is a synonym for Ātman in the Upanishads; and bliss is an inherent characteristic of the Self along with *Chit* or consciousness. The *Taittiriya Upanishad* gives a gradation of this bliss, according to the spiritual advancement of the self, beginning with the maximum human standard of happiness, and leading up to the absolute bliss of Brahman. The happiness that finite individuals enjoy in the mixed life of Samsara is a fragment of this absolute bliss. If we read carefully the characteristics of the *Sthitha-prajna*, (Bhagavad-Gītā, II, 55-71) we find that, while Śrīkrishna repeats and emphasises the fact that the Jnāni is absolutely indifferent to pleasure and pain, at the same time, he makes it plain that it is only sensual feelings that he becomes indifferent to, as they only distract the mind and disturb its peace which is essential for the enjoyment of that inner bliss which is nothing but one's own self. The freedom from sensory impulses and their distraction ensures that calmness and steadiness of the mind which raise it above all pain and suffering (II. 65); and once that inner calm and peace of the mind are secured, the self enjoys infinite and unbounded happiness that is its own inherent attribute. Therefore, the ascetic disciplines that the Lord enjoins on the seeker after the Vedāntic goal, and the absolute freedom from the feelings and the emotions that he often insists upon as characteristics of the Jnāni—the *nirvāṇa* ideal of the Gītā are to be understood only to mean indifference to the ordinary pleasures and pains of the senses and freedom from the passions and excitements which life on the physical plane often plunges the mind into. Consequently ethical feelings, unselfishness, pity and compassion for suffering creatures, brotherhood and sympathy have a place in the ideal life of the liberated soul (see Bhagavad-Gītā XII, 13.), according to Vedānta, but not according to Sāṅkhya. Bondage according to Sāṅkhya is bondage of the three guṇas; and emancipation

of the self is emancipation from all feeling and emotion which are the effects of the *guṇas* only, and consequently have no place in Puruṣa himself. He is pure consciousness in himself and nothing else.

The Yoga system of Patañjali is not an independent philosophical school, but embodies a course of practical discipline for the mind to reach the Sāṅkhya goal of Kaivalya. According to Patañjali, mere philosophical knowledge or Viveka is not sufficient to ensure that freedom for Puruṣa from the threefold miseries of life which Sāṅkhya sets out to obtain. The eternal Samskāras of the mind and the habits of thought due to them are not got rid of at once when knowledge of Prakṛiti and her ways and of the true nature of the self is attained. This hold of the mind on spirit through its samskāras can be put an end to only by a course of practical discipline beginning with *Prāṇāyāma* and ending with *Nirvikalpa samādhi*. By this means the intellect is rendered fit to reflect the true nature of spirit. Once this state is reached, the link that connects mind and Puruṣa is severed ; and Kaivalya of the latter becomes an accomplished fact. Mind has dissolved into its Prakṛiti. The graduated course of Sādhana outlined by Patañjali to realise this is not mere psychological discipline, but intended to produce a better and higher order of ethical life than the ordinary life of the house-holder. As the Yogi advances in spiritual life, he has gradually to give up many things that he considered of value hitherto, including all worldly pleasures, happiness and enjoyment. For thus only can the mind be altogether cleaned of its inherent impurities.

All ordinary conduct is partly virtuous and partly vicious; and all bodily action involves some sin or impurity; for it proceeds from the 5 kinds of kleśas. 1. Avidyā, the ascribing of consciousness to the intellect and regarding it as necessary to our happiness and well-being. 2. Asmitā, the thinking

worldly objects and experiences as belonging to us, all self-appropriation, egotism, *Ahaṁkāra*. 3. *Rāga*, the attachment to pleasant objects due to self-appropriation. 4. *Dvesha*, aversion to unpleasant things due to the same cause and 5. *Abhiniveśa* or the will-to-live—the desire to continue one's bodily existence and one's association with the mind, etc. The first of these or *Avidyā* is the primary *kleśa*, from which the others more or less arise. The false identification of spirit with intellect is the root-cause of the former's bondage and suffering. The *Kleśas* belong to the intellect, and goad us to perform actions and undergo the consequent suffering. They follow us from life to life; and are not finally got rid of till emancipation is reached.

Patañjali regards *Avidyā* as a positive state, consisting as it does in knowledge that is opposed to true or right knowledge. Regarding the ephemeral as eternal, the impure as pure, vices as virtue, the undesirable as desirable, is *avidyā*. To the *Yogī*, every state of phenomenal existence is painful. *Rāga* or attachment to sense-objects gives us only temporary pleasure; for it soon turns to pain. Enjoyment never brings satisfaction, but plunges one more and more into sorrow. Again all enjoyment of pleasure involves pain in the form of aversion to pain. The latter is only due to previous experience of pain. The experience of pleasure and pain causes impressions on the mind; and they, together with their associates give rise to the memory of pleasure and pain, which in its turn gives rise to desire and aversion, from which proceed actions, producing in turn fresh pleasure and pain and fresh impressions, memories and attachments and so on, in a never-ending chain.

From this it follows that a *Yogī* who wants to be entirely free from pain is anxious to avoid all so-called pleasures. He resembles the eye-ball in this respect. Even a fine fibre or

a particle of dust causes pain when it comes in contact with the eye-ball and not with other parts of the body. Similarly, all pleasures affect the Yogi and cause him nothing but pain. Ordinary man, on the other hand, constantly subject to pleasure and pain owing to their previously acquired *Vāsanās*, and being subject to *Avidyā* and having minds full of suffering, and not being free from feelings of "I" and "mine" as regards external objects, are constantly subject to the threefold suffering of worldly life. But the Yogi, contemplating himself and the world of living things thus subject to the eternal sway of pain, turns his mind to right knowledge and to the means of getting rid of all pain and suffering.

Ahaṁkāra due to *Avidyā* is the root-cause of bondage and suffering according to *Sāṅkhya-Yoga*. It is also the cause of passions like anger, which arises when one is thwarted in the attainment of what one regards as objects of pleasure; love of good living, vanity and self-assertion and the consequent conflict with fellow-men. All these have a tendency to lead us further and further away from our ethical goal, viz., the realisation of our true selves. (Das-Gupta—"Indian Philosophy")

There are no followers of *Sāṅkhya* philosophy as such in India to-day though there are many who keep up the practice of yoga as taught by Patañjali as an essential form of *Sādhana* in the realisation of one's true self. *Sāṅkhya*, pure and simple, found itself unacceptable in India, partly owing to its pronounced atheism, and partly to its attributing to an unconscious and unintelligent external reality all the almighty powers which we are accustomed to ascribe to a living God. Nonetheless, in its rigorous analysis of our inner or mental constitution; and in its ascription of our psychic tendencies and cravings to a non-spiritual cause, and in trying to strip

spirit entirely of everything but its pure light of consciousness, it is worthy of our serious regard. But in not including in that light, the light of joy or Ānanda also it has made a serious mistake.



The Place of feeling in Conduct in Bauddha and Jaina philosophy.

BY

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Both the Bauddha and the Jaina systems of thought are pre-eminently ethical, aiming as they do, at the purity and glorification of the will and effort of an individual that leads to his salvation. In neither of them is there any room for grace or election, but either of them claim the possibility of attaining this ultimate goal, this *summum bonum* as the birth right of the individual even at the risk of being termed atheistic and heretical by the so called orthodox thought-systems of India. But even as ethical systems they differ, in a marked degree, in their conclusions as to the nature of conduct and its final goal as they follow from their metaphysical postulates and psychological background. While Buddhist ethical thought is marked by a thorough psychological analysis which would do honour to any modern system of psychological Ethics, the Jaina makes much of the metaphysical assumptions of the soul as conscious substance and of Karma as a material principle mysteriously affecting the soul, throwing psychological considerations to the background. Whatever the merits of a synthetic philosophy, either Eastern or Western, which claims to take an undifferentiated view of life and the universe, it is a special problem for the modern mind, whose watch-word is the division of labour, to look at the different aspects of life in their proper perspective without confounding issues. Considered in this light Buddhism seems to make a nearer approach to psychological Ethics than Jainism, nay, in some sense, than any other system of Indian thought.

In estimating the function of feeling in conduct in the Buddhist thought one would do well, first of all, to understand what exactly the Buddhist means by a psychological individual. The psychological individual is a complex of *nāma* and *rūpa*. The *nāma* is a collective term for all that is mind and mental, and the *rūpa* for physical attributes. The Buddhist psychologist further differentiates this *nāma-rūpa* complex, this psycho-physical whole of an individual into the five-fold *skandha* or aggregate, viz., *Rupa, Vedanā, Samjñā, Saṃskāra* and *Vijñāna*, of which the *Rūpa-skandha* is the organic basis for the *Vedanā, Samjñā* and *Vijñāna skandhas*, for affection or feeling, perception and conception respectively, to which the *Saṃskāra skandha* serves as the synthetic mental function which is at once a source of all conation and of coordination of all the other mental faculties. Thus the conscious life to the Buddhist is an indivisible whole in which we can distinguish perception, feeling and will only logically, but not in an order of succession.¹ The objects of consciousness are distinguished into the objects of sense and objects of thought. The objects of sense are five : sight, sound, smell, taste and touch ; the objects of thought are also five : (1) *Citta*, mind, (2) *Cetasika*, mental properties, (3) *Pasada rūpa*, sensible qualities and *sukuma rūpa*, subtle qualities of the body, (4) *Paññatti*, name, idea or concept and (5) *Nirvāna*. In Buddhist psychology, however, we miss all explanation of how sensation is transmuted into ideation except the assumption that *citta* or mind which is both of the nature of thing and thought, only *does* transform the one into the other, reminding one of the psycho-physiological myth invented by Descartes in his pineal gland. We have indeed quite a lot of terms, like, *vitākka, vichāra Sāti, anussāti, patissāti, saṃpajañña, cetana, sañcetana, saṅkappa,*

1. *Atthasālini*. Pp. 143-44.

and the rest, indicating how the Buddhist Introspective psychology had an incipient or inchoate conception of the ideational processes of judging, comparing, remembering, mental alertness, even attention, and volitional and concentrative consciousness ; but we do not meet with any closer analysis of the intellectual process, which in modern European psychology, has been called representative or re-representative cognition² or ideation, except reference to the general concept of *Vijñāna* which stands for any 'awareness of mind' no matter how general or abstract the content.

Coming to the psychology of will, however, one would notice that the Buddhist strikes the keynote to all psychological ethics when he makes will not only a fundamental of conscious life along with its other fundamentals of cognition and affection, but also the basic and dominant element which determines and co-ordinates the rest. The concept of *saṃskāra* according to both Childers and Mrs. Rhys Davids is comprehensive enough to include the conative and co-ordinating function of the will. One also finds in Buddhist literature, in *Dhamma-saṅgāṃ*, for instance, the clear demarcation between psychological will and the will of ethical implication. *Chanda* and *viriyam*, desire and effort considered psychologically, are ethically neutral. but in their ethical evaluation, they assume a new meaning and content, as they are directed towards lower or higher pursuits. The Buddhists thus emphasise will or conation as the central fact of mental life and it redounds no little credit to their psychological genius when we find that some of the eminent British psychologists of to-day have come to realise the same central fact. The old European psychologists up to John Locke were busy with their description of the mechanism of sense ;

2. Cf. Mrs. Rhys Davids' *Buddhism & Buddhist Psychology*.

it was perhaps Schopenhauer who first recognised the "dynamics of consciousness" the supremacy of will in the economy of mental life, in his allegiance to Kant's Practical Reason. But a far closer psychological analysis has led Professors Alexander and Mc Dougall to stress the basic and dominant character of conation in all mental life.³

Consistently with the empirical and scientific standpoint, Buddhist psychology, too, makes no assumption of a psyche as the perduring conscious entity, but states that the I-consciousness is an event among other events in the chain of causation resulting in and supporting what is called an empirical individual. The famous Buddhist doctrine of *Pratītyasamutpāda* or dependent origination explains life and the universe as a network of causes and effects, moving in the direct as well as in the reverse order, the first link in the chain being ignorance, and the last, suffering, when it moves in the progressive order of evolution, and in the retrograde order, life, world and suffering shrivel back into nothingness, paving the way to *Nirvāṇa*, by the gradual destruction of the chain of originating causes beginning from ignorance. In the series of twelve causes or *niḍānas*, the only assumption that the Buddhist makes, for all scientific explanation must make an assumption, is that of Ignorance (*Avijjā*) which imparts, as it were, a starting push to the rolling of life and existence giving rise in succession to *Saṃskāras*, or misconceptions, *vijñāna* or consciousness of self, *nāma-rūpa*, mind and body, the *Saḍāyatana*, the six senses including mind, *spassa*, contact, *vedanā*, emotion, *Tanhā*, craving or desire, *upadana*, clinging or attachment, *bhava*

3. Alexander's Paper in *British Journal of Psychology* 1911, P. 244. Mc Dougall's paper on "Purposive or Mechanical Psychology" in *Psychological Review*, 1923. P 183; also his *Outline of Psychology*.

birth, *jāti*, rebirth and *jarāmaraṇa*, old age and death. The strong ethical ground-tone which vibrates throughout Buddhist Psychology is characteristic of Buddhist thought which is ethical before anything else. Pledged as it is to the scientific attitude the Buddhist would not allow in his scheme of existence anything which is uncaused ; but without bothering about the metaphysical problem of the nature and origin of Ignorance, it assumes it as the beginningless starting cause of the whole show.

Our empirical existence is grounded in our 'will to live' which carries with it the implication of its negation which is another name for *Nirvāṇa*. But the will which is the ruling principle of life has for its co-efficients feeling and intellect. Now the will may be said to be at once the master and slave to feeling and intellect. So long as ignorance has its full play and is not dissipated by saving knowledge, the will manifests itself in perception or cognition, but before it issues forth in conative reaction it is already tinged with *vedanā* or feeling and emotion. In its lower form feeling is only unregenerate impulse, craving or *tanhā*, while rationalised *Tanha* is desire ; and it is the *tanha* and desire, with the help of the *upādāna* that move the will and bring about the world of existence with its suffering. The Law of Karma as an informing principle functions like the warp which receives the woof of our acts physical, biological and psychical, which make up our existence as an individual. Individuality is the 'seat of suffering and apparatus for bondage, and the aim of right effort or conduct is to dissolve the individuality. But the dissolution of individuality consists in the regeneration of the will by *prajñā*, right thinking or enlightenment which elevates and edifies its feeling-co-efficient. The feeling-co-efficient of the will then ceases to function as passions and desires of the lower type under *vijñāna* and fails to produce *moha* or illusion.

It then no longer directs the will to produce effects for the individual which entail retribution, but is itself so controlled by the will that the acts become free from *āsravas* and productive of well-being and are therefore called good. Good acts are thus the results of the will which is no longer a slave to *tanhā*, but has overmastered it. They are now marked by *alobha*, absence of lust, *adveṣa*, absence of hatred, and *amoha*, absence of delusion, and are directed towards the production of happiness, not of the individual but of the world at large.

Conduct has been broadly distinguished into two classes, according to its spring and result. When it springs out of unselfishness and issues forth in acts of love and compassion, it is called conduct of well being and when it rises out of egoism and results in acts of malice etc. it is called conduct of ill-being. The Buddhist gives various enumerations of the two types of conduct, sometimes entering into their very minute details and sometimes only laying down the principles which underlie all possible varieties of the two types of conduct. And it is interesting to note that the early Buddhist codes of duties agree, in all essentials, with those of the upaniṣads and the Gītā, showing how the Buddhist and the Hindu were unable to outgrow at least the common tradition of Indian moral life.

Now we may fairly be said to be in a position to gauge the function and value of feeling in ethical life according to the Buddhist. The Buddhist analysis of a state of consciousness reveals that it is never a state of consciousness, *qua* consciousness; it is always either good, bad or indifferent with reference to its effect. It is good if its effect is well-being, when we have *sukha*, it is bad if its effect is ill-being, when we have *dukkha*, and it is indifferent if its effect is neither and we have neutrally toned feeling. Nirvāṇa is the absolute well-being or happiness at which only a few of the creatures

can aspire. Nevertheless it is true that all creatures strive after happiness in varying manners and degrees according to their growing moral and intellectual equipments. Psychological life being regarded by the Buddhist as an indivisible whole, none of the elements, intellectual, emotional and volitional is separable from the other two. The spring of action is never the blind *feeling* of want totally unilluminated by intellect and unregulated by will, as the ordinary European ethical science based on the tripartite division of mental life asks us to suppose. The Buddhist spring of action is always feeling *cum* intellect and conation. It is of the lower or higher order according as it is illumined by intellect in increasing degrees and is regulated by more and more regulative will. An action to be good and to be better and better on an ethical scale must have its underlying *tanha* transmuted into higher and higher desire. It is the regeneration and not extirpation of desire, its expansion such as to embrace the well-being or happiness of the whole conscious existence that constitutes the true ideal of Buddhist morality, and not its narrowing down to egoism, making it more and more self-regarding and less and less other-regarding. The moral will of the Buddhist is not the unfeeling blank will of Kant, but it is super-saturated with the higher feelings and emotions of love and active sympathy for the entire universe.

It is evident then that Buddhist ethics is for the culture and not for curbing of emotions and desires. The aim of conduct is to produce happiness or well-being, not of the individual but of the society at large. Buddhist Ethics is therefore utilitarian in its outlook, but unlike the utilitarianism of Bentham which looks more to the outward consequences of actions, it always attaches more value to their inner motive or spirit, which, it thinks is discernible by reason or *prajñā* of the psychological individual and is therefore intuitionistic as well.⁴

4. Cf. The Intuitionist Utilitarianism of Sidgwick.

Another important question relevant to the subject is that of freedom which the Buddhist solves in quite a scientific spirit. There is the principle of Karma as the norm of the Universe and there is also the empirical self governed by that norm. The analysis of the empirical self into its qualities, the dhammas, the affections, thinkings and willings and their saṃskāras or dispositions, is quite in keeping with psychological science with its limited sphere. Within the sphere of scientific psychology which describes the rise, growth and development of psychoses and traces causal connection amongst them, Determinism reigns supreme. But the marked peculiarity of the Buddhist psychological Ethics is that it has on the one side provided for limited freedom of human actions, and on the other, has saved them from Indeterminism which regards free will as an unpredictable force that alters or undoes the orderly working of the mind. Under the law of Karma the empirical self is a growing expanding and evolving process of psychoses whose present is determined indeed by the past, but whose future remains open and is created by the new direction of the will. The determination of the present by the past, however, is not a purely mechanical process, the present, though it accords with the past, and thus ensures continuity with it, yet is not the only possible result of it; for the suggestion in the Anguttara Nikāya⁵ as to the *character* of the reward to be won by the deeds of man unmistakably points at least to the limited contingency rather than to the iron necessity of human actions. On the other hand the Buddhist avoids the Bergsonian Indeterminism of the human will, in so far as he is careful to assert the orderliness of the natural world by means of the Law of Karma and yet provides for spiritual growth, which, when it has attained the highest form, prajñā-

pāramita, can overcome and transcend Karma, and reach beyond good and evil, but can enjoy the highest bliss.

The psychological position of the Jaina presents, however, a different picture of the life and activity of the soul in its relation to the world. The Jaina holds to an unmitigated dualistic or rather pluralistic metaphysics in which his psychological tenets are grounded and which also colours his ethical conclusions. He divides the whole of existence into the Jiva and the Ajiva, soul and non-soul. The Jiva or Soul is the eternal spiritual substance which is not one but many and whose essence is pure consciousness. The Ajiva or non-soul which is fivefold, consisting of Dharma, Adharma, Ākāśa, Kāla and Pudgala is characterised by unconsciousness. The soul is the subject, and as such is the jñatā, bhoktā and kartā, the knower, enjoyer and doer, and the non-soul is the object of reactions of the soul, of its thinkings, feelings and willings. Of the five kinds of the non-soul Dharma the principle of motion, Adharma, the principle of rest, Ākāśa, the condition of existence of bodies and Kāla, the condition of persistent process and duration are all *amurta* or formless and the fifth one, Pudgala, the basic material principle which underlie all that is perceptible by the senses, the sense-organs, the physical mind, the various kinds of bodies, and the Kamas is *mūrta* or with form. Things that we perceive are composed of gross matter; but there is also subtle matter, beyond the reach of our senses, which is transformed into the different kinds of Karma. These five categories of non-soul constitute the limited world of objects or *Loka* beyond which there is the unlimited or immeasurable called the *Aloka*, the abode of the liberated soul. The psychological life which belongs to the ordinary mundane soul consists in its constant commerce with this world of *Loka* which it transcends in its supra-mundane existence.

Now without entering into further metaphysical

details of the Jaina system of thought we would do well to analyse its conception of the psychological soul. The soul of the Jaina is a substance (Dravya) and as such it, as all substance, is characterised by the aspects of permanence, influx and change of its qualities. It is therefore something permanent in the midst of changes (*pariṇāmi nitya*) a unity in difference, and maintains its psychical unity and reality in and through its qualities and modifications (*par-yāyas*), its feeling-, thinkings and willings. The Jaina does not conceive of the absolute distinction between the substance and its attributes, like the Naiyayika, nor does he identify the substance with its qualities like the Buddhist, so that his soul is not intrinsically devoid of its consciousness and its modifications of thinking, feeling and willing which are only adventitious to it like the Naiyayika's soul, nor is it equated with the mere congeries of psychical states and processes, as is the case with the Bauddha. The mundane soul is in constant conjunction with karmic matter which as a retarding principle, has on the soul the effect of suppressing or at least crippling its conscious powers in different degrees, depending on the intensities of the retarding force and degrading it to the lowest type of conscious existence like that of the metals where there is only one sense of touch, until the highest type of consciousness or kevalajñāna is once more restored to the soul when it becomes the siddhātman. The Jaina is an out-and-out dualist and leaves it an open question as to why and how the soul may have anything to do with the non-soul and stops short at the psychological point of view, accepting psychoses as facts resulting from an assumed contact (*yoga*) between the soul and the non-soul. This assumed contact is not, however, the explanation of psychical perception, but only helps to remove the veil which covers the knowledge of the soul.

According to Jaina metaphysics the jivas in their uncon-

taminated state are really possessed of the characteristics of infinite knowledge, purity and bliss. But when they are thought of as entering into psychological relation with the objective world, they become penetrated with karmic matter. Directly, however the jivas are the causes of such *bhāva-karmas* or mental products only, as attachment, aversion etc ; and these *bhāva karmas* then lead to the production of *Dravya karmas* or material resultants which consist of particles of matter. The *upādāna* or substantial cause of the *Dravya karmas* is, therefore the pudgala or matter, and their *nimitta* or determining cause is the *Bhāva Karma* or that psychical condition of the jīva which renders it susceptible to the influx of dravya karma or material particle. Thus the jivas, though intrinsically unaffected by the fruits of the Dravya or pudgala karmas and enjoying infinite bliss etc, are, nevertheless subject, as psychological centres, to attachment aversion, etc, and under the influence of these self caused mental modifications they become prepared for the inrush of pudgala which makes them enjoy sorrow and delight, happiness and misery.⁶ The psychical life of the soul thus begins with its contamination by pudgala or karmic matter ; it is the *bhāva karmas* in the shape of desires that give the starting push to the soul for its psychical voyage. The soul-substance, regarded as subject, being jñātā, bhoktā and kartā has the three-fold form of consciousness, knowing, feeling and conation, but among the three aspects of the psychical life feeling (*leśya*) is apparently the prior element which determines conation and knowledge. We do not get anything more of psychology in Jainism whose dominant interest is ethical.

Mokṣa or deliverance is the highest goal of ethical life and

6. *Dravyasangraha* : verses 8 and 9 and Brahmadeva's commentary thereon.

consists in regaining infinite knowledge, purity and bliss by the falling off of *karma*. It is to be attained through the *triratna* or three jewels, viz. *Samyak Darsana* or right faith, *samyak jñāna* or right knowledge and *samyak charitra* or right conduct. With the attainment of these emotive, intellectual and conative eminences, the influences of the *Ghātiya* or retarding karmas disappears of itself. The elaborate Jaina scheme of the *bratas* or vows and of the *pariśahas* or troubles and sufferings and *pariśahajayas* or victories over them indicates that the ethical system of the Jaina is more rigoristic than that of the Buddhist. It is not regeneration but destruction of the life of feeling that commends itself to Jaina ethics. It looks upon privation as the highest good and pleasure as a source of sin and misery. Man's whole endeavour must be directed to the attainment of complete independence of the feelings of pleasure and pain. True freedom consists in the stoic indifference to all the outer things which alone can make the soul absolutely self-determined. The life of contemplation and meditation has been recommended as leading to the acquirement of strength enough for the fulfilling of the *bratas*. But the *jhyāna* (*dhyana*) of the Jaina is only a subsidiary process as compared with the *jhyana* of the Buddhist to whom it is the final concentrative psychical process which ensures for the Buddhist perfect self-possession and complete tranquility which is *Nirvāṇa*. And the Jaina has carried asceticism to such an extreme that he has recommended even suicide when the aspirant is found unable to resist passions and endure austerities necessary for salvation.

In *Sāṃkhya* the *Puruṣa* is a transcendental conscious existence. In its real character it is *akartā* and *abhoktā* and therefore it cannot be thought of as participating in feeling, conation and intellection which constitute the life of the psychological self. The psychological self with its empirical

contents is an evolution of Prakriti which is material in principle. The Sāṃkhya system commits itself to an unmitigated dualism between the self and the not-self, between subject and object. The object is not the self-differentiation of the subject, nor is the subject an immanent principle realising itself in and through the object. The empirical self really belongs to the object-world, for buddhi or intellect which is the emanating source of the empirical existence, is itself an evolute of Prakriti, the other of the Puruṣa. The Puruṣa is thus, in the language of the Jaina, an *aparīṇāmanīya*, an undifferentiated and undifferentiating real, which has nothing to do with empirical existence. Hence bandha and mokṣa which belong to the empirical or dematerialised puruṣa do not affect the real self. Feelings, desires and emotions, intellection and volition, their mutual relation and particularly the problem of freedom which make up the psycho-ethical sphere have been relegated by the Sāṃkhya system of thought to the realm of an inessential excrescence of the puruṣa, with the result that Art, Religion and Morality which are the offshoots of emotion, intellection and volition fail to receive the share of importance and recognition they deserve.

Nor does the Yoga system ethically improve matters when it says that the life of the yogin is a long course of practical discipline undergone with a view to putting an end to the never-ending chain of the experiences of pleasure and pain giving rise in succession to mental and bodily impressions, memories of pleasure and pain, desires, aversions and actions which last again produce fresh pleasure and pain and so on. For even obviating the apparent logical parallogism involved in this so-called psychological analysis, we cannot save the yoga system from the common defect of the Sāṃkhya whose metaphysical postulates it accepts, viz, that of making the psycho-ethical life of the empirical self a mere unreal

scaffolding of the transcendental puruṣa which it kicks off, so soon as it realises its true nature as pure consciousness.

In the Vedānta, however, the dualism of the objective and the subjective, the Bhūman and the Atman, the cosmic and the psychic principles is overcome and we have a well-grounded metaphysic of morals. The Upaniṣads maintain that Brahman is Atman, the Infinite is immanent in the finite. It is the inmost being of the universe and all its phenomena. What is real is one but differentiates into the many. The world of many is at once the source of bondage and freedom to the finite soul. It is a source of bondage so long as the many stand out as such and each of us clings to his individuality as an exclusive unit, as an ego sharply walled off from whatever is outside his physical, biological and psychical history. And this individualism, this egoity is the root of all that is morally bad and the truly good man is he who subordinates his individual and personal ends to universal and social ends—who realises the Infinite in the finite—who looks at things *sub specie aeternitatis*. The final goal of moral life is thus the realisation of the oneness with the universal consciousness whose essence is the highest and the fullest Bliss or Ananda. Every individual, everything that is, is a fragment of that Ananda whose full realisation is the lot only of the liberated. The liberated abdicates his narrow personal feelings and desires, his egoity and selfishness in favour of the highest Bliss or Ananda. Feelings, desires and emotions have a function and value in the ethical life of man in so far they, by their production of the opposite of what his intrinsic nature longs for through them, suggest a transvaluation of all his ordinary values—a true and abiding satisfaction as against the partial and insufficient ones they entail. The ethical tenets of the Gīta also agree in all fours with those of the upaniṣads. The essentially good life of the *Jivannukta* is the same as that of the *Sthitaprajña* of the

Gita. Disinterested actions are advocated in both the Upaniṣads and the Gita, perhaps a little more enthusiastically in the latter. Both the upaniṣads and Gita also agree in their acceptance of the organic relation between the psychical aspects of man who is regarded as the complex of reason, emotion and will. The only point of difference which seems to lie in their conception of *mukti* or ethical freedom, is one of degree and not of kind. The Gita makes salvation to consist in the union with the GoIhead, the embodiment of wisdom, beauty and holiness, attainable by man who, though an integral whole of conscious existence, seems to work it out with occasional, apparent antagonism amongst his Jñāna, Bhakti and Karma aspects of his life. But the practical and religious tendencies which are incipient in the upaniṣads are made more emphatic in the Gita; and the latter, in its conception of Puruṣottama (making all allowance for the controversy as to the question) unmistakably points to a personal God in whose grace or gift lies the salvation of man.

If however, we are to take a purely scientific view of ethical life, divince grace or intervention in the matter of man's ultimate goal, as the upaniṣads and especially the Gita insists, can hardly have either logical or psychological justification. Both Buddhism and Jainism being humanistic in their outlook, holding man or the psychological individual as the snpreme actor in the whole drama of life are rightly loath to introduce any *deus ex machina*. If liberation or ultimate freedom is something to be achieved and not awarded, it must be left entirely with the human agent to achieve it by extraordinary psychical endeavours in their superlative degree. Both the Buddhist and the Jaina emphasise the supremacy of prajñā in the guidance and regulation of right conduct to save it from āsrava which entangles man into the snare of karma. Karma, we repeat, has been given the supreme part

to play in the ethics of both, because both are averse to the supposition of a personal moral governor supervening on human affairs. But the Buddhist true to his genuinely scientific attitude has displayed the greater ethical sagacity to conceive of the principle of Karma as the *norm* or moral order of the universe, while the Jaina makes a fetish of it, and degenerates it into crass *pudgala*, rendering it wholly unintelligible as to how it can percolate into the conscious life of man, unless by the unwarranted assumption of something like the Pre-established Harmony of Leibniz.

The Place of Feeling in Conduct.

Advaita.

By

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Nearly all the Indian systems of philosophy teach, on their practical side, the necessity for cultivating *vairūgya*. The reasons assigned for its cultivation may vary in the different systems, but they all agree that it is necessary. The need for it, so far as the Advaita is concerned, is clear from its inclusion in the fourfold aid to Brahma-knowledge set forth by Sāṅkhya in the very beginning of his commentary on the *Veśānta-sūtra*. Now *vairūgya* means dispassion or detachment from interest; and when we take this along with another of the qualifications laid down as necessary for entering upon the life of a Vedāntin, viz. discrimination between the eternal and the transient (*nityānityavastu-viveka*) with its emphasis on reason, it seems that feeling has no place in conduct according to the Advaita. The point that we have to consider is whether this conclusion is in consonance with the doctrine taken as a whole; and, if it is not, to find out what exactly is to be understood from *vairūgya*. We shall consider the subject in two parts, as the discipline constituting the life of an Advaitin is broadly divisible in two stages. Before proceeding to this consideration, however, it is necessary to state clearly the sense in which the word 'feeling' is used here. It is taken in the sense of feeling of value or interest which the conscious pursuit of an end always implies. I do not at present propose to ask in what other sense, if any, feeling is involved in conduct, and shall postpone what I have to say on this point to the close of the Paper.

I

The chief means recommended for the cultivation of *vairāgya* in the earlier of the two stages referred to above is the adoption of the life of a householder. The underlying idea here is that detachment cannot be achieved in the abstract, but only living in the midst of others and discharging the manifold duties that devolve upon one by doing so. The activities of a householder are, generally speaking, three-fold: They include, in the first place, what are described as *sādhāraṇadharma*s, or duties common to all without distinction of class (*varṇa*) or stage of life (*āśrama*) such as the practice of kindness, forbearance and charity. Next come those like fortitude and temperance that have reference to the self, and may be described as duties of self-culture. Lastly, and for the most part, they consist of duties towards one's special environment which is conceived mainly, though not exclusively,¹ as social. They are, for example, duties like fighting for one's country and king in the case of a prince and hospitality in the case of a householder. Being relative to the position which a person occupies in society, they are not binding on all; but, within the respective limits of their reference, they are quite obligatory and no one is allowed to choose from or change them at pleasure.² In other words, they belong to the sphere of the hypothetical, and not to that of the categorical, imperative. The first and last of these sets of activities, which aim at helping others, necessarily involve a good deal of self-denial. The second kind of activities also lead to the same result, but by directly imposing restrictions in various ways on impulsive action. Neither form of activity, however, precludes the pursuit of what is

1. Compare the significance of daily rites like the five *mahā-yajñas* or 'great sacrifices'.
2. Except when one changes one's *āśrama*,

termed *abhyudaya* or lower human values like rank and riches, provided it does not come into conflict with the chief aim of the discipline of this stage, viz. self-culture and social service. It is the check upon selfish propensities implied in such discipline that is to be understood from *vairāgya* in this stage, and not a complete abandonment of interests. Even in the case of activities whose end is not personal, there is a pleasure which the agent feels in the thought of others' good ; for otherwise he would not choose to labour for it. Hence feeling is not excluded from conduct in this stage.

It may be said that, though the discipline of the householder's life as described above might not once have excluded feeling from conduct, it does so now, because the conception *varṇāśrama-dharma*s has since been totally transformed by the teaching of the Gītā³ that whatever one does should be done without any thought of the result which may follow from it. This teaching may doubtless be taken to mean that duty should be done for its own sake, and that it should therefore be divorced from all interest. In that case there may be no room for feeling, in our sense of the term, in conduct. But, according to Sāṅkara with whose doctrine we are now concerned, disinterested activity, in the literal sense of the expression, is a psychological impossibility ; and to insist upon it in the name of morality is, as he observes to reduce life to a form of meaningless drudgery.⁴ There is accordingly no conflict between duty and interest ; and

3. The Gītā Ideal is, no doubt, in theory the starting-point of advaitic discipline ; in practice, however, the householder's ideal, as originally conceived, is retained as a concession to the weak.

4. See e. g. com. on the Gītā, iii. 1—*Vihitasya karanā-karanaych dukkha—mātra-phala*.

even deeds performed in the spirit of the Gītā teaching have in end, viz., *sattva-śuddhi*, 'the cleansing of the heart' or 'the purifying of the affections'. What is meant by the counsel that all thought of fruits should be dismissed from one's mind in the doing of duty is not that it should be emptied of all motive but that the *diverse* purposes of the deeds that fall to one's lot in life should be replaced *by one and the same* end, viz. self-conquest or the moral improvement of the agent. There is thus an end here as much as in the previous stage; only it is of a higher type, because it shuts out altogether the desire for inferior values (*abhyudaya*) and aims solely at subjective purification. *Vairāgya* means here the total abnegation of such inferior interests and not merely restraining one's natural inclinations. It thereby becomes much wider in its scope; but yet, as it does not altogether exclude the idea of an end in which the agent is interested, feeling will continue to have a place in the conduct of this stage also.

It is necessary to dwell a little longer on the nature of this ideal for it may appear that, though it does not abolish all interest, the type of conduct (if we are to understand from it 'moral conduct') which it signifies is anything but the best from the ethical standpoint. The Gītā teaching applies to all kinds of deeds—self-regarding as well as other-regarding; and the result of doing the latter also for the sake of *sattva-śuddhi* will be to transfer the attention of the moral agent from their legitimate objects, viz. the persons and institutions whose interests they are intended to serve. Nobody questions the importance of subjective purification in a scheme of moral discipline, but the result of aiming at it in the Gītā manner seems to exclude the social aim which is essential to all true ethical conduct. It diverts the attention of the moral agent from others and concentrates it on his own betterment. In fact, the emphasis on the

individual is a common charge brought against Hindu ethics in general and advaitic ethics in particular. In answering this objection it should be admitted that the *Gītā* ideal does dismiss the social aim. But the dismissal of the social *aim*, we should add, does not mean the dismissal of the social *view* for, though the welfare of society as such ceases to motivate action, it is not excluded from the agent's mind. This is clear from the emphasis laid on *sva-dharma* in the *Gītā*. Its teaching, as we all know, insists not only on acting without any desire for fruit in the sense explained above, but also on the performance of one's own duties, i. e. duties of one's station in society.⁵ It is explicitly stated⁶ that their intrinsic character is of no consequence, and that it is their social significance that alone matters. Since it is the fulfilment, at all hazards, of these duties on which the *Gītā* insists, it cannot be regarded as separating the individual from society. It is true that doing everything for self-betterment implies that all altruistic deeds are reduced to the level of a means instead of being regarded as ends in themselves. But that does not make the activity less objective. This aspect of the teaching becomes clear when we remember the alternative phrase used by Sāṅkara for *sattva-śuddhi*, viz. *Īśvarārtham* ('for the sake of God') which represents these duties as what one owes to God rather than to oneself. The training seems, no doubt, to care only for the agent, but it does not really ignore the gain that should accrue to society by one's membership of it. Its aim is not so much to take him away from society as beyond it. The fact is that, according to the *Gītā*, social and individual ends cannot be completely reconciled; and the attempt made to adjust them in the previous stage can, at best, result only in a sort of working

5. See Sāṅkara's com. on ii, 31.

6. iii. 35.

compromise. It is with the purpose of removing the very possibility of collision between them that the *Gitā* substitutes for the dual motive of the earlier stage the single one of self-culture, purging it at the same time of all taint that may arise from the simultaneous pursuit of material and such other lower interests.

II

The main aim in the second stage is to know the ultimate reality ; and its knowledge, as we shall see, will further alter the significance of detachment. The person that enters upon this stage, as we stated before, already possesses this knowledge (*viveka*), but it is mediate and will just suffice to indicate in a general way the direction in which advance is to be made for knowing that reality immediately. His present purpose is to achieve this end. In order that he may accomplish it the better, he assumes *samnyasa* which, like the other *āśramas* has its own duties, so that the practical part of the discipline does not come to an end with its assumption. This stage again consists of two parts—one in which the disciple is striving to realise his purpose (*vividiṣā-samnyāsa*), and the other in which he has succeeded in doing so (*udvat-samnyāsa*); and we shall consider each separately :

(1) In regard to the former, we should first point out that the adoption of *samnyāsa* means taking a vow of non-injury (*abhyāsa*)—a fact which shows that the Vedāntic disciple cannot grow oblivious of his environment, by which term we have to understand not merely human society but the whole of living creation including the meanest thing that feels. But it may be thought that, though he may not ignore the existence of others, his attitude towards them is purely negative and does not signify any positive striving for their sake. Even in the pessimistic schools of India which consider aloofness, or the isolation of the self from everything else,

to be the ideal, the life of the saint is far from being self-centred ; but, however that may be, it is certainly not so in Advaita. The best proof of it is found in the conception of Brahman, or the ultimate reality to be realised here, as *ānanda* or bliss. Since the Upanishads look upon all distinction as the source of pain,⁷ this conception implies the oneness of Brahman with the whole of existence. It is this oneness then which the disciple should now discover through his own experience, if he is to realise the highest reality ; and he cannot obviously do so by neglecting others. This shows that his attitude towards the environment cannot be negative. On the other hand, it necessitates the cultivation of universal love,⁸ not in the sense of love for others *as others* but *as oneself*. 'He that sees all beings in himself and himself in all beings—he will not turn away from them.'⁹ *Vairāgya*, reaches its highest form here, and means the complete annihilation of egoistic interests implied in such love. That is, the aim here is not, as in the earlier stage, merely to seek for oneself an end which cannot come into conflict with that of others, but to transcend the very distinction between the self and the not-self. It may appear that the transcendence of this distinction, by eliminating all interests, will lead to the elimination of feeling from any conduct that may characterise the disciple thereafter. Such an objection can apply only to the culminating phase of the training, which we shall presently consider. So far as its other phases are concerned, the disciple is aware of himself as pursuing an end, and he therefore necessarily feels interested in it.

(2) In none of the stages of discipline so far considered,

7. Cf. Br : Up : I iv. 2 : *Dvītyādvai bhayam bhuvati*.

8. The renunciation, signified by *sannyāsa*, refers only to the duties that are specific to the householder's state.

9. *Īśa. Up : 6*.

whose common aim is to further the growth of detachment, is the kind of life, which the advaitic disciple leads, bereft of either altruistic activity or feeling. We have now to deal with the last phase of fruition or *jīvanmukti* where that detachment has become perfect. Here, however, we can take into account only the *vyutthāna* or waking phase, for the other, viz. that of *samādhi* or trance is exactly like *videha-mukti* whose conception is eschatological. The latter is, no doubt, in strictness the final goal; but we are not concerned here with it, because it admittedly lies not only beyond the notions of right and wrong but also beyond all activity. There is not much to be stated in respect of this phase. The conduct of the previous phase here becomes spontaneous.¹⁰ That is, *vividiṣā-samnyāsa* is transformed into *vidvatsamnyāsa* or aspiration is replaced by achievement. One that has reached this state, the ideal stage, knows neither preferences nor excursions; and everything is equally sacred to him—whether it be, in the words of the Gita, ‘a cow or elephant or dog, the cultured Brahmin or the outcaste that feeds on dogs.’¹¹ He now ceases to belong to any class or order and becomes a citizen of the universe, as we might put it. The moral striving which marks the lower stages is once for all left behind;¹² but the elimination of strife does not mean the elimination of activity as is abundantly shown, for example, by the kind of life that Śaṅkara himself led. Fruition does not mean rest.¹³ The activity, no doubt, is not directed towards any personal end because in attaining

10. Cf. *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* iv. 69.

11. V. 18.

12. *Vedānta-sūtra*, IV. i. 12.

13. See Vidyāraṇya's comment upon the expression *udāsīnavat* occurring in Gītā ix. 9 & xiv. 23 : *Pañca-daśī* vi. 272 ff. Cf. *Ibid* vii. 130. See also Gītā iv. 34.

Brahman the sage has attained all. *Āptakāmasya kū spṛhā*. But still it cannot be regarded as divorced from feeling, for it is inspired by his equal love for all, or his interest in the whole.¹⁴ The activity is, in fact, the concrete expression of that love. We may, if we like, suppose that it involves self-interest also; only we should then bear in mind that it is not the egoistic, but the true or universal self that is meant. *Vairagya* does not accordingly mean the abolition of interests but only the extinction of narrow egoism. Hence the present stage, like the previous ones is not bereft of either activity or feeling. But both of them come to have a new meaning by reason of the complete knowledge that has been attained. The one becomes wholly impersonal, and the other is transformed into cosmic love.

III

It is time now to recur to the question alluded to in the beginning; viz. whether feeling, in any other sense, is involved in conduct. Broadly speaking, Indian thinkers conceive of the standard of moral judgment in two different ways. Some Mimāṃsakas, viz. the followers of Prabhākara, look upon it as a law which demands implicit obedience, while all the remaining schools of thought, including the Bhāṭṭas, take it as an end whose realisation is regarded as desirable. The Advaitin adopts the latter view and describes the end as *iṣṭa* or what is desired by the agent. And since, according to him, the only object of desire is pleasure (or the avoidance of pain), it alone constitutes the end of all purposeful activity.¹⁵ Hence, according to the Advaita, feeling has a bearing on conduct not only in the sense of interest as implied in the conscious pursuit of an end, but also in that of pleasure as

14. Cf. *Gītā* iv. 24.

15. Cf. *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*. Chap. viii. Cf. also Saṅkara's com. on *Gītā*, xiii. 2. *Rūgāḍīdoṣa-tantratvāt pravṛtteḥ*.

constituting that end. In other words, feeling is both an efficient cause of conduct and its final cause.

It will be objected that to represent pleasure as the goal of all conscious activity is to hark back to the hedonistic doctrine which has long been exploded by scientific psychology. But, seeing the remarkable measure of agreement that exists among Indian moralists on this point in spite of the ascetic outlook on life that prevails among them, it is difficult to believe that the theory is without a satisfactory explanation. Confining our attention to the Advaita, we may suggest the following interpretation. Pleasure is conceived here as a mode of the *antaḥ-karana* ; and, as no *antaḥ-karana* is significant without reference to a particular *jīva*, it really stands for a state of the empirical self. Further, the pleasantness of such a state is in this doctrine, as distinguished from the Sāṅkhya for example, due to the nature of the self and not to that of the *antaḥ-karana*. Consequently it seems that when pleasure is spoken of as the goal of all purposeful activity, we have to understand that what such activity aims at is the realisation of some state of the self. The goal is not therefore mere pleasure but a form or type of concrete experience of which pleasure or satisfaction is an invariable feature. The exact kind of experience which a person seeks at any time naturally depends upon his conception of the self at the time, or what comes to the same, upon his character. It is not possible, and it does not seem necessary, to consider this topic further here ; but we should refer briefly to one point of importance before we close. If all purposeful activity alike points to 'pleasure' as its end, it may be asked what makes the difference between right and wrong action. In answering this question we have to remember that the satisfaction which can be realised on the empirical plane is notoriously unstable, and that there will sooner or later be a lapse from it. But when one rises above that plane and identifies oneself with all, it

becomes final and lasting. It is this 'stable satisfaction' or abiding poace that is the ultimate goal of life, according to the Advaita ; and it furnishes the criterion by which all conduct is to be judged. That conduct is moral which, by helping the conquest of the lower self in the manner described above, prepares the way for such peace ; and that which hinders it is the reverse.¹⁶ Moral conduct is thus only an aid to the attainment of the highest end which is beyond good and evil.

16. The satisfaction which such activity yields is termed *preyas*, or the merely pleasant, to distinguish it from *śreyas*, the final good. See *Kaṭha Up* : I. ii, 1-2.

The Place of feeling in Conduct.

Advaita.

By

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I.

Conduct has, in this context, to be understood as the spiritual discipline (*Sādhana*) by which freedom (*Mukti*) is attained. This is common ground in all the Indian systems. In a secondary sense, conduct implies those preliminary attainments which qualify one for a life of the spirit, for philosophical discipline. Śaṅkara enumerates these under the four well-known heads.¹ These preliminary acts, however, derive their value in so far as they are directed towards realising the ultimate goal. So it is with conduct in the primary sense that we shall be mainly concerned.

Conduct of this nature is very different from the moral *ought*. It is not, strictly speaking, enjoined or injuncted. Moral conduct is a social attitude based on justice, on the recognition of the rights of other personalities. Spiritual conduct is of necessity individualistic. Though not anti-social it is certainly non-social, not being realisable as a virtue. The demand to know and realise the self cannot be equated with morality. It is a unique direction of spiritual endeavour arising from a sense of unreality and impurity of the world. When and why this spiritual inkling emerges at a particular time in an individual's life is more than what we can say. Perhaps there is no cause for this, but only occasions, e.g.,

1. Br. Sūtra Bhāṣya. I. 1. i. : Discrimination of the essential from the non-essential, renunciation of all enjoyment in this and the other world, practising of austerities and self-control and the desire to be free.

utter disgust, suffering, illusion etc. The point to be noted is that spiritual endeavour stems the outward flow of the spirit and seeks to transcend the world. It is not interested in bringing about a betterment of the social and material welfare of oneself and other members of the society. Though sometimes expressed as an injunction, the demand to realise the self is only metaphorical not literal.² It is an inner urge.

A word about the nature of feeling and its possible place in conduct. Feeling is the type of consciousness best exemplified in pleasure or satisfaction. If a definition of it were to be attempted, we may conceive it as the unity of consciousness and content. It is non-cognitive, lacking the detachment and distinctness characteristic of knowledge. In knowing, the objective attitude is predominant. The content of knowledge is, as in truth, unconstituted by and distinct from, the subjective act of knowing. There may even be a demand to realise the truth as what is not, and need not be, known. In willing, the willed act or content is wholly *through* the willing, not having any being without the latter. In feeling, content and consciousness form an indistinguishable whole; separation of the one from the other would mean abstraction and loss of the feeling tone.

Feeling may function in conduct in one of these two ways: either as its means (*Sādhana*) or as its end (*Sādhya*). We have for instance, in religious consciousness and in some types of non-advaitic schools of Vedānta, the feeling approach to the Ultimate. Love or devotion (*bhakti*), the feeling identification of the finite self with the infinite, is recognised as the chief

2. Cf. Saṃkara on Br. Sūt. 1. i. 14 : "Tatraivam sati yathābhūta-brahmātmaviśayam api jñānam na codanāntantram. Tadvīṣaye līṇādayaḥ śrūyamāṇā apyanyaijyaviśayatvāt kunṭhibhavanti, upalādiṣu prayuktakṣurataikṣṇyavat, abhayanupādēyaviśayatvāt. Kimarthāni tarhi "Ātmā vāre draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyaḥ" ityādinī vidhichchāya vacanāni. Svābhāvika pravṛttivīṣayavimukhi karaṇārthāniti brūmah." cf. also *Bhāmati* on this and *Siddhānta-leśa*, I. Vidhivicāra.

if not the only means of attaining freedom.³ As the end of conduct, feeling—pleasure or even the riddance of pain—may be the motive actuating any spiritual endeavour; desire is the incentive to conduct. Instead of consciously aiming at it, conduct may culminate in feeling as its fruition. When any task is successfully completed, a feeling of pleasure may supervene. But it would not be quite true to say that the resultant feeling was the motive for undertaking the task. We consider these alternatives in order,

II

Can the Vedāntic discipline have any place for feeling as the means of reaching *Brahman*, the self? It is expressly stated that knowledge is the sole means of attaining freedom. To know is to be Brahman. Like the means, Brahman is also of the nature of knowledge. Rather, it is the conception of the absolute as knowledge that suggests the knowing path and excludes the other means.

What is known is, or should be, independent of the act of knowing; it is prior to and unconstituted by the latter. I only discover a being already there (*Pariniṣṭhita, Siddha-vastu*). Otherwise, the notions of truth and falsity have no meaning. Again, the content of knowledge is not for me alone, though I happen to know it. I believe it to be true precisely because it is what it is irrespective of me or any other percipient. It is self-existent and self-evident. It is really the unrelated, being fully significant without relation to other contents or to the knowing act.

What, however, is actually claimed to be known is not of this nature. We are not quite sure whether the object of our knowledge is not constituted, in some measure at least, by

3. The *Gītā* teaches "Yoga" or the identification of the individual with the cosmic will, through self-surrender, disinterested action and love towards God.

the subjective act of knowing. There is the need to realise it as a Being free from all process of willing. Secondly, the object of knowledge has also to be realised as unrelated to the knower, as something in itself without its appearance, as not even a relatum but only accidentally, freely, revealing itself. In the last resort, this would mean the abolition of the relational mode of approach, all relation being, in the main, a mode of feeling.

Spiritual discipline in the Vedānta consists in purifying given experience of all factors which are not knowledge, but which nevertheless *appear* as knowledge. There is no experience which does not imply Brahman, pure knowledge. Illusion itself is possible because of this pure Being. Though the most positive and prius of things, it is reached through negation. The truth is known by cancelling falsity. An example of empirical illusion would make this clear. It is only as we dissociate the "snake" from the rope, the false appearance from real being, that we are at all said to know reality. The "snake" is only *felt*, not known, as it does not and cannot have a being of its own ; it is nothing apart from its appearance in consciousness (*Pratibhāsamūtra śarīra*). Not so the rope. It is real and was so even when we did not know it. But for its being there, the "snake" could not have even *appeared* as real. Brahman is of this nature. We may say therefore that what appears is illusory,⁴ and that the real does not and need not appear.

In actual procedure, there is first the suggested falsity of the world and the sole reality of Brahman through revelation. Then we have the "thinking criticism" of things whereby the distinction between the true and the false is made intelligible. The culmination is reacted in the purely contemplative or

4. *Advaita Siddhi*. I, 9-11. pp. 233 ff. *Dṛśyatvāt, jādātṛvāt, paricchinna-tvāt mithyā*.

non-relational consciousness (Akandārtha-vṛtti) where even the duality of the false and the real, of the content and the act of knowing is transcended. The realised identity is not a relation, being devoid of all difference. Difference is not essential for identity, but there is identity inspite of the differences. It is of course true that only as we cancel the differences e. g. the differences in *Tat* and *Tvam*, that we become conscious of the inherent identity. The ultimate knowledge cannot be expressed as a judgement, but is the implication of all judgements.

We may now characterise the method Brahman is realised through a critical analysis of experience, negation or cancellation of ignorance meaning only this. There is a progressive deepening of insight simultaneous with the abstraction and purification of the given. Throughout, the whole process is informed by the light implicit from the outset. Though not intellectual in any narrow sense, it is knowledge purely. It might be seen therefore that feeling has no place as the accredited means of self-realisation. It is what is abstracted and rejected as non-knowledge like the "snake". It is of course possible to admit feeling as a secondary means. Devotion to God and to the *guru*, disinterested loving of all beings etc., are accepted as *leading* to knowledge, through self-purification and detachment, so essential to knowledge.

En passant it may be pointed out that the place of feeling in conduct is analogous to the position of *īśvara* and the *Sākṣi* in advaitism. They represent the creative (willing) and the feeling functions of spirit which are not accorded the ultimate place; this is reserved for Brahman-spirit as knowledge. Not ultimate like Brahman, *īśvara* is still not phenomenal; he is the Lord, eternally free (*Sadaiva muktaḥ, Saduivesv irah*). So all is the *Sākṣi*. For the disciple, *īśvara* is an object of worship and meditation (*upāsana*). Feeling devotion to him admittedly helps in the removal of ignorance; his grace, as

that of the *guru*, may lead us to Brahman. Even a rigorous advaitin, accepting knowledge alone as the means, can possibly have no objection to recognising feeling as a secondry means.

III

We now take up the question regarding the motivation of conduct. What is the urge behind it, why is it undertaken ? The Naiyāyika apparently is a hedonist. He contends that all conduct is motivated by pleasure or the absence of pain as the end. He refutes ⁵ at some length the thesis of the Prābhākara that injunction, the knowledge that one is so commanded or 'duty for its own sake', is sufficient incentive to conduct. Desireless action, *Niṣkāma-karma* as inculcated by the Gītā, would on this view, be a myth, an impossibility. However true this may be of natural (*Naisargika*.) conduct, we cannot concede this as explaining all conduct. To do so would be to interpret higher conduct by the lower ; the reverse may well be more consistent. The opposition between the life of desire and the life of reason is soon felt. Such an opposition, much less the preference for the path of reason exercised by a few individuals at least, admits of no explanation if conduct were guided by the desire of pleasure. The advaitin clearly allies himself with Kant and Prabhākara as against the hedonist. Spiritual life begins with *Vairāgya*, with the abandonment of desire in all forms. The desire for an external end, the very attitude of gain and grab is *unspiritual* and is contrary to the urge to know Brahman. For, it outwardises the spirit and carries it towards phenomena.⁶ It would be a quibble to say that the advaitin desires desirelessness. Nor is it true that *vairāgya* is a tentative or prudential measure.

5. See *Nyāya-manjari*. V. pp. 313 ff (Choukhamba Edn.)

6. Sāṃkara's oft-recurring expressions to characterise *Samisāra* are these : *Kriyākārakaphalātmaka*, *Sādhya-sādhanabhūta*, etc.

For, after knowing the self the vairāgya becomes deeper, if anything.⁷

We have here to recognise the life of the spirit as a value in itself, and not because of its serving as a means to something external. In the initial stages this inwardisation of the spirit strikes a note of sharp contrast against natural impulse and even against morality. It appears as a value among other values. Deeper insight reveals that other values are but shadows, objective symbols or misdirections of the self. It is only thus that can we understand the famous passage in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (II. iv. 5,) where it is conclusively shown that self-realisation is the only value in all the so-called values.

To know the self is no "duty"; it is not a matter for injunction notwithstanding the imperative form in which it is sometimes expressed. Injunction is invariably a command imposed externally, and is concerned with achieving something new. The justification and demand for the life of spirit is from one-self; there is no external standard.⁸ Ultimately the sense of realisation is itself to be realised as false. This realisation is obviously beyond discursive consciousness. The upshot of the discussion is that spiritual conduct is as far removed from moral conduct (Dharma or Sāstriya karma) as it is from natural propensities. It transcends both. It would be misleading, if not unmeaning as well, to speak of self-realisation

7. Cf Br. Up. III. v. 1. "Realising this Ātman, the sages transcend the desire for children, desire for wealth and the desire for the world, and go about begging."

cf. *Yoga-Sūtra-Bhāṣya* I. 16. Jnānasyaiva parā kṣāṭhā Vairāgyam.

8. cf. Sāṃkara, Br. Sūtras. I. i. 2. also II. I. 4.

Na dharmajijnāsāyām iva śrutyādaya eva pramāṇam brahmajijnāsāyām. Kintu, śrutyādayo-nubhāvādayaśca yathāsambhavamihā pramāṇam, anubhāvāvāsānatvād bhūtavastuvīśayatvāt ca brahmapramāṇaya. (I. i. 2.).

as directed towards an end, pleasure or absence of pain.⁹ Here no distinction can be made between the means and the end. The self is realised as it is withdrawn and disassociated from externality, from the not-self. It is a corrective, a spiritual *Katharsis*, rather than an acquisition.

IV

Though not an external end, the Vedāntic absolute is not devoid of feeling. Feeling is not *aimed at* precisely because it is the self itself. Brahman is conceived not merely as knowledge but as bliss as well. It is Reality, Knowledge and Bliss all in one—*Saccidānanda*. The concept is peculiar and needs some elaboration. Meantime, it is interesting to contrast it with the stage of freedom in the other systems.

The Nyāya-ātman is devoid not only of feeling but of consciousness; it is a state of eternal death as it were. Here as in the Hīnayāna schools of Buddhism, freedom is a negative state, cessation of pain not being conceived as having any positive aspect. For the Sāṃkhya-Yoga freedom is the isolation—*Kaivalya*—of pure consciousness from matter (*Prakṛti*). It is not a state of joy or power or even of knowledge these being treated as functions of the object—*Prakṛti*. The Sāṃkhya Puruṣa is conscious, but does not feel, will or know. Vedānta would differ from this as it refuses to recognise any objective functions. In the last resort, knowing, feeling and willing are spiritual, though in experience they may appear objective. The object is nothing but the externalisation of these functions and their confusion with one another. Cancellation or spiritual discipline is the annulment of this externality, objectivity, and this is tantamount to the realisation of the self-hood of each of these functions. Each is the self, absolute.

The orthodox Vedāntic conception of *Saccidānanda* favours this interpretation. We have to note that this is an essential

9. Cf. *Bhāṣa* I. i. 4. *Taddhl phalam iva phalam*; *avidyāpanaya-mātreṇāvirbhāvāt*. (P. 114, N. S. Edn.)

definition—*Svarūp-lakṣana*—of Brahman. It is definition *per se* as here the absolute is not understood in terms of others as in the *Tatastha lakṣana*, but in itself. Secondly *Sat Cit* and *Ananda* are neither parts nor qualities of the Brahman. But each is the infinite, complete and independent.¹⁰

The Vedāntic approach is through knowledge, but Brahman is not merely knowledge. Importance attaches, in this connection, to the conception of it as Joy. By a critique of experience it is shown that all pleasure is really the shadow of the Bliss of Brahman.¹¹ The analogue on the cognitive side is that all knowledge is traceable to the pure consciousness.

Due to our inveterate objective attitude we believe that objects give pleasure; but in reality the object serves as an occasion for the inwardisation of the self-function (*Vṛtti*), and the resultant pleasure is only the index of the innate joy of the self. The enjoyment is circumscribed by the intensity and duration of the particular occasion; anon, the *vṛtti* gets outward again. And hence empirical enjoyment is a pleasure not bliss; it is an emergent event not eternal and overlasting. But all these limitations pertain to the objective occasions engendering the feeling and not to the feeling itself. The close similarity of this analysis of feeling with that of knowledge is too patent to be missed.¹² Brahman as joy is, in a very real sense, the fruition of all conduct.

10. *Advaita-Siddhi* II. 2. Pp. 675 ff.

11. cf Br up. IV. iii. 32 : *Etasyaivānandasyānyāni bhūtāni mātrām upajivanti*. Also : Tait. Up. II. 7. *Eṣa hiyevānandayāti*.

12 cf. *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā*—I.

Human progress and some of its implications.

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To the many answers given to the question raised by the Rt. Hon. Sir Herbert Samuel in the pages of *Philosophy* as to what kind of philosophy will best satisfy our "dissatisfied, anxious, apprehensive generation", Professor Collingwood adds an important one, namely, "what is needed to-day is a philosophical reconsideration of the whole idea of progress or development, especially its two main forms, 'evolution' in the world of nature and 'history' in the world of human affairs."¹ The concept of progress is more and more occupying the minds of men in this century. Contemporary events in the spheres of politics, economics, and social affairs, are making men doubt whether history is advancing towards a better future, whether greater evils are not in store for humanity. Professor Collingwood's recommendation to reconsider the whole idea of progress becomes all the more important in view of this prevailing sceptical outlook. The progress of humanity or history is not discontinuous with natural evolution. It is, as Sir Herbert Samuel says², its continuation, and is distinguished from it by the fact that, the species concerned make a conscious contribution to it. We shall deal in what follows with the concept of human progress in order to bring out some of its implications.

Many contemporary philosophers have been actuated by faith in progress. Writing on the causes of the appearance of

1. *Philosophy*, July, 1934, p. 264.

2. *Practical Ethics*, pp, 200 sqq.

Italian Neo-idealism, Dr. Angelo Crespi says "For the ancient world and the Middle Ages Man stood before the independent reality of Nature as a powerless being who could only passively know and obey. Since the Renaissance Nature has increasingly become something like a tool or a weapon in the hands of Man, who has become ever more conscious of a kind of intrinsic divinity. The myth of the Golden Age, of the Fall, of the Envy of Gods, as the key to the greatness and decay of empires, having increasingly yielded to the myth of indefinite progress through science and industry, of History as progress in a single irreversible direction, of indefinite accumulation of experience and endless approximation to a final state of universal happiness and perfection."³ At the end of his *Moral order and Progress* Professor Alexander shows his leanings towards the view of heaven as a future event,⁴ and in his *Space Time and Deity* he explicitly teaches us that Deity will come to be in some far-off distant moment. Bergson, like the Italian idealists, believes that reality is pure becoming or process, a continual growth upon itself.

In many of these philosophers the faith in progress seems to be as unquestioned as the faith in God during the Middle Ages. As against this faith we may mention T. H. Huxley's view that the process of nature is quite opposed to the ethical. He writes: "As I have already urged, the practice of that which is ethically best that we call goodness or virtue—involves a course of conduct which, in all respects, is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence."⁵ Further, he says: "The theory of evolution encourages no millennial anticipations. If, for millions of years our goal has taken the upward road, yet, sometime, the

3. *Contemporary Thought of Italy*, pp. 204-5.

4. p. 413.

5. *Evolution and Ethics and Other Essays*, pp. 81-2.

summit will be reached and the downward route will be commenced. The most daring imagination will hardly venture upon the suggestion that the power and intelligence of man can ever arrest the procession of the great year."⁶

If it is asked whether we are not superior to animals, and to the savages with their human sacrifices, cannibalism, worship of stones, trees, and animals, we have to answer in the affirmative. None of us would prefer the life of the savage to the one we are leading now. Of course, the answer to the question whether we are happier and more comfortable than our ancestors may not be in the affirmative. Apart from considerations of comfort and happiness, the knowledge we have so far gained about the nature of reality we would be reluctant to forfeit. Yet there seems to be a limit to human progress, at least in depth if not in width. In spite of the scientific knowledge we are accumulating and the superstitions we are discarding, the question about the value of our knowledge, whether this knowledge is worth much if it cannot make human beings happier, cannot but be raised.

This question is only a different form of the question: What is the goal of our human progress? Why do we call this march of events progress? History, for the mere reason that it is a succession of events which are of human importance, cannot be regarded as progress. Something more must be implied in history in order to make it progress. Gentile tells us that "man is history because the essence in virtue of which he is contraposed to the necessity of nature is freedom. Nature is, mind becomes"⁷ That mind becomes, that it is history and progress, seems to be taken for granted as an unquestionable and irreducible fact by him. If he tells

6. *Ibid*, p. 85.

7. *Theory of Mind As Pure Act*, p. 202. (English Translation.)

us that he is merely describing mind as he experiences it, then it is possible for another to modify or deny his statement on the basis of his own experience. We can maintain that our experience tells us that mind transcends becoming by making it an object. Even if Gentile's statement is not denied, the becoming itself cannot be progress. If Gentile means more by his assertion than a description of fact, then progress and becoming must be accounted for. Progress is no progress unless it progresses towards an ideal.

For the same reason we cannot accept Croce's view that the historical judgment and the judgment of value are identical. He writes "*Die Weltgeschichte das Weltgericht*: the history itself of the world is the judgment of the world, and in recounting the course of history,.....we do, however, apply a judgment, which is that of necessity and reality. That which had been had to be; and that which is is truly rational."⁸ On this point we can agree with Croce only so far as his statement means that the world-spirit is eternally readjusting itself. The wrong done now will be made up some time later. But we cannot maintain that whatever has happened is good. We hold the faith that time will cure the present evils. But this faith is not the same as the belief that history is always good. Every historical event is not good. The burning of Rome by Nero is certainly not good. It may be said that the good asserted itself later. But if we are to accept Croce's view literally, every person should take the events of contemporary history as the expression of the good. But if so, if the present generation does not feel the defects and evils of the time, there could be no spur to progress. Which means that in the actual operation of the factors of history, the judgment of value is distinguished and set against the historical judgment.

8 *Philosophy of the Practical*, p. 96. (English Translation.)

So complete and absolute immanence of the ideal contradicts the very idea of progress. It is the ideal that gives value to the historical fact, passes judgment upon it. The root of the difficulty lies in regarding the cosmic process as a continual growing upon itself, as an infinite progress merely. But mere infinite progress is a contradiction in terms. It implies the absence of an ideal, and without an ideal progress would not be progress. If, on the other hand, there is an ideal, then it should be transcendent. It should not be identical with the historical fact itself.

On the other hand, absolute transcendence leads to other insurmountable difficulties. If the ideal is absolutely transcendent, unconnected with fact, it would be unrealisable. But an unrealisable ideal is no real ideal, but a fancy and fiction. If we accept such transcendence, we shall be led to the Kantian doctrine of infinite approximation to the ideal. Croce writes: "The true conception of progress must therefore fulfil at once the two opposite conditions, of an attainment, at every instant, of the true and the good, and of raising a doubt at every fresh instant, without, however, losing what has been attained; of a perpetual solution and of a perpetually renascent problem demanding a new solution. It must avoid the two opposite one-sidednesses of an end completely attained, and of an end attainable, of the *progrèssus ad finitum* and of the *progrèssus ad infinitum*," If the attainment is at every instant, then at any instant the ideal must be realised; and it would be a wonder how there could be any scope at all for further progress from that instant. Of course, if the attainment is partial, there could be such scope. But if the attainment at every moment is partial, we have to understand that the ideal is always partly immanent, and not wholly. That is, the ideal must be both

9. Quoted from Bosanquet's *Contemporary Philosophy*, p 57.

immanent and transcendent. As immanent it can act as an impulsive force and as transcendent as an inducing motive.

For want of an ideal Spencer's formula of evolution cannot explain progress and creation. The process from indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to definite, coherent heterogeneity may or may not be progress. The process towards more and more complexity need not be creative. It is the imprint on the new complexity of a new simple quality which imparts harmony to the members, that makes the process creative. Further, as Joseph remarks, we cannot rightly call a crab more definite and coherent than a crystal.¹⁰ The appearance of this new quality is called emergence by Lloyd-Morgan. But emergence usually means the appearance or coming up of something already contained. Students of Indian philosophy are familiar with this theory as *satkaryavada* in the Sankhya system. Though we cannot get everything out of everything as oil from sand, yet we cannot accept the view as a box-within-box theory. We cannot understand how the great oak is contained within the acorn before 'emerging' from it. Mere emergence cannot be of new qualities. If the qualities are new, their creation must be accepted somehow. Therefore Bergson's conception of evolution as creative is more to the point.

Yet even Bergson's creative evolution seems to be unpurposeful. The process of history cannot be explained satisfactorily by this concept. The contribution by the individuals and the species to the historical progress cannot be denied. At this level values and a conscious striving after their realisation are the prominent factors. Bergson's concept is a description of the urge or *nisus*, but this urge seems to be blind and purposeless. He calls the theory of final causes and ideals inverted mechanism,¹¹ and gives no place to the essential

10. *The Concept of Evolution*, p. 5.

11. *Creative Evolution* p 41 (English Translation)

element of transcendence. Even history has to be regarded on his principle, as pure change.

Yet while dealing with dynamic religion and morality, Bergson tells us that the activities of leaders of men and mystics run counter to nature.¹² The impetus in them may be continuous with what is found in nature. Yet Bergson admits that intelligence acquires an independence of nature and the original impetus, and sets on foot processes and movements by itself. This admission means that the course of history is distinct from that of natural evolution by being purposive and consciously directed towards the realisation of values.

Just like becoming and progress the urge also is taken to be an unquestionable truth. It is not further explained. So far as human activity is concerned, it is always guided by the idea of a better future, of an ideal existence unrealised. We admit that mind is restless, it is always a flow. But this assertion is not all that can be made about it. Besides the consciousness of our continuity through the flow, our activity, whether theoretical or practical, is always purposeful, and only as such is it rational. Purposeless activity is not rational activity. As activity is part of the essence of our being, Bergson's idea can give only a partial description of our being. That is, he presents us only the urge. But he does not explain why there is this urge, and what its direction is. Activity in children may be purposeless. But history is not purposeless activity. It is said that creation is the *līlā* or play of God. But it is not *līlā* or play for us ; and our activity is not play.

This urge can, therefore be fully explained only by postulating a partially transcendent ideal. Aristotle teaches that God is the ideal form, and acts as an attractive force ; yet he tells us that there could be no form without matter. Similarly, a transcendent ideal must be immanent in our activity. Of

course, as conscious beings we are self-determined ; the urge must somehow belong to our nature and so must be immanent. But our actions are motived, and the motive cannot be completely immanent. The urge as having a direction must be directed towards the motive. Full explanation of the urge must include the reference to the motive.

Because of the operation, in history, of ideals, theory and practice mutually influence each other. Theory arises only because of an unattained ideal, and is tested by practice. Theories differ according to stand-points, and the validity of every theory is tested, not merely by the criterion of self-consistency, but also by practice, that is, by the criterion of consistency with life. Life is the final judge of all theories. It is pointed out that coherence is not the final test of truth, because from every stand-point we can have a system of philosophy¹³. We can be free in our speculation and may soar too high, but it is life that brings us down to the stubborn facts of reality. To make our system consistent with itself it is possible for us to posit new facts, postulate new principles, and explain away some facts and principles. But such systems break down on the hard rock of life. And whenever an old theory is found to be invalid, a new theory is developed. So pragmatism is not absolutely false. It can easily entrench and defend itself at this point.

Hence, Croce's view that theory comes first and does not depend on, and presuppose, practice is not very cogent. If, as he does, we start with the concrete fact of history, we find that theory always guides practice, and practice always tests theory. We cannot find a moment in which pure theory without, and uninfluenced by, practice exists. Of course, our action is always motived ; we work for the object we desire ; and we

13. Bertrand Russell : *The Problems of Philosophy*, p. 191. See also his *Analysis of mind*, p. 228.

cannot desire a thing unless we know it. Yet this cognition or knowledge of an object is not the same as theory. Theory is a system of knowledge, and no system of knowledge can be constructed out of pure cognitions unaided by practice. One trend of modern thought represented by Santayana and others regards every datum as pure essence, which is self-identical in imagination, fancy, and perception, and out of which no theory of the actual can be constructed. We may not accept all that these philosophers say; yet it cannot but be admitted that pure contemplation by itself cannot yield us the theory of the actual. For example, the particular shape of a piece of sugar and its taste get associated in our knowledge. But pure contemplation can associate any shape and any taste. A piece of alum may be mistaken for a piece of sugar. But practice can set our cognition on the right path. Practice may fail to decide the final truth, but so also theory. Neither pragmatism nor coherence can give us final tests of truth. That is why we have to regard both theory and practice as mutually corrective and directive. Further, they enrich each other.

Croce too tells us that both theory and practice are factors of history and mutually influence each other. He writes "Knowledge serves life and life serves knowledge. The contemplative life, if it is not to become idle stupidity, must complete itself in the active, and the active life, if it is not to become irrational and sterile tumult, must complete itself in the contemplative."¹⁴ None can reasonably contradict Croce on this point. Now, with the progress of history these two factors also progress. But how can theory progress unless corrected and bettered? And by what is theory corrected except by practice? Every theory helps in the formation of patterns of behaviour, and every practice in the formation of patterns of thought. If both are mutually determinative, theory as much presupposes practice

14. Quoted from H. W. Carr's *The Philosophy of Benedetto Croce*, p. 109.

as practice theory. If we divide history into different epochs, we shall find that every epoch is characterised by distinct patterns of thought and practice. In each we find a guiding or leading idea which bestows its uniqueness on these patterns. It is that idea which forms the ideal and furnishes the stand-point from which the attempt is made to systematise our theory and practice. But life is too wide and deep, and infinitely rich in detail. No single idea, because of its finitude, can supply an adequate stand-point and ideal for the whole of life. Hence, after a time, when the attempt is made systematically to work the idea out, it breaks down at some point or other. People become sceptical about the truth of the existing order of things, and wish for a new one. Leaders of men appear, who are specially gifted with the ability to plunge down the depths of our being, and come out with a solution of their doubts and questions. But the answer they get takes the form of a definite concept, which must naturally be finite. Yet it solves the outstanding problems of the moment, and supplies a new pattern of thought and practice. Humanity grows enthusiastic over the idea, deifies it, and again begins systematically to work it out in all directions. But the finitude of the idea precludes perpetual obeisance to it.

If such is the actual process of history, we have to admit that the ideal of historical progress always remains transcendent. But not completely transcendent, for the being of history is rooted in the very being of the ideal. The motive in every epoch of history is obtained from that ideal, and it itself supplies the urge and restlessness to man to move forward. If the ideal is realisable at any moment of history, at that moment progress would stop, and we cannot steer clear of *progressus ad finitum*. Nor would progress then be sheer *progressus ad infinitum*; for the absolute ideal manifests itself as the ideals of different epochs of history, as those

concepts which determine the forms of thought and behaviour in those epochs. Each of these ideals is realisable, but because of its imperfection complete realisation of it in all branches of experience produces disaster rather than happiness, and for that reason the ideal is given up for another.

This aspect of our experience bears witness to the view that the absolute ideal is not realisable in time, that God and the Absolute are above time. Yet their being above time does not render them absolutely transcendent. They are and must be immanent, and only because of this immanence do we receive intimations of perfection and harmony in the depths of our soul. Again, only because of the absolute ideal's being above time, can it form the eternal motive of history, which, again, must be eternal. If history is to be eternal and is not to stop at any moment of time, it should have an eternal motive and an eternal source of its urge. These are supplied by the absolute ideal. It may perhaps be objected that there is no real progress, and what seems to be progress is only process. But we cannot deny the fact that at every moment of history a better future is hoped for. Without such hope humanity would commit suicide. While a new concept is being worked out, we hope for a better state of things after the work is completed. On its failure and breakdown, we hope that a new leading idea will save us, if discovered. To some extent our hopes are realised. As we have said, a new concept, when discovered, solves and removes many outstanding problems and difficulties. It is able to do so, as long as it is not stereotyped and fossilised, and retains the freshness and plasticity of its birth from the absolute ideal. The leaders of men who discover it, discover it as a solution of the problems that perturb their minds. But that concept may not serve as a solution of future problems and as a remedy for future evils. Then the need for a new concept arises. Thus humanity continually finds that it is progressing, that

it is continually surmounting difficulties and solving problems. Humanity is at its best, enjoys peace and harmony, when the absolute ideal is transparent in its thoughts and actions. The progress of humanity may be described as a perpetual attempt to retain this transparency. An asymptotic approach, as in Kant, to the absolute ideal would mean its complete transcendence ; but if the ideal is quite unconnected with the temporal fact, it would not be a true ideal. Every philosophy of history must take into account the endlessness of history and the immanence of a transcendent ideal. An asymptotic approach, as it implies complete transcendence, cannot do justice to the element of immanence, and temporal realisation of the ideal to the element of transcendence and the endlessness of history. If due recognition is made of these elements, temporal realisation, at its best, should be regarded as reflecting the absolute ideal. That only is what humanity can achieve in time. Yet we cannot maintain that history is sheer process, a mere change. The continual and conscious striving after the better differentiates history from pure change.

Though not in time, full realisation of the ideal is not an impossibility. It is here that mysticism has its place. Every true philosophy, as McTaggart says, "must be mystical, ...in its final conclusions".¹⁵ It is mystic life that lifts us above time and brings us face to face with the absolute ideal. Even the leaders of men who discover new ideals to guide our lives are to a certain extent mystics. Unless they go down the temporal actuality, they cannot get the initiative to set new movements afoot. Their minds are more transparent to the real, and because of this transparency, the harmony of the real reflects in them the missing note which is to turn the discordance of the temporal facts into a harmony.

But people in their enthusiasm over the discovery, mistake the new note for the harmony of the real itself. Even if they do not commit the mistake, as the absolute ideal, which cannot be adequately expressed in concepts, cannot but be given some conceptual form or other in order to work it out, it will naturally fail after a time. In almost every mode of thought and every system of philosophy, we find certain ideas which are treated as ultimate. The fact that no concept or idea can adequately express the nature of the ideal is ignored. Ultimate reality is transcendent and its functions are transcendental; so concepts, when required to perform these transcendental functions, break down. For example, Bergson's duration or pure change suffers from this defect. The world of extended things has to be derived from pure change; but we cannot understand how such derivation is possible. If pure change is to evolve the world, it cannot be merely pure change, but must transcend itself. It is true that Bergson arrives at this concept after pointing out the shortcomings of other concepts treated as ultimate. But similar defects vitiate this concept also. The concept holds in the phenomenal world, but it can ill-perform the transcendental functions attributed to it. The fact is that the being which is to perform the transcendental functions cannot be grasped through concepts, for the very reason that it does not belong to the world of finitude. It is the Absolute, and is realisable only in mystic life.

The progress of history is regarded by some as cyclical. But history, so far as we know it, does not seem to be a mere cycle. It is said that history repeats itself, while it is equally maintained that it does not repeat itself. Plato teaches us that the forms of state succeed one another in a circle. But it can hardly be maintained that the present forms of government are absolutely identical with those called by the same name by Plato. Because the spheres of human

activity are divided and limited, the dissatisfaction with one form in a sphere may lead us to think of a previously abandoned form and revive it with modifications. But there seems to be no *a priori* necessity for the process to move in a circle. In some spheres the process may be cyclical, in some spiral, and in others in a line ; or in the same sphere we may find all. At least natural evolution does not seem to be cyclical or spiral.

Nor is it necessary that the progress of history should be a dialectical process. It is of course often the case that the tendency of the less reflective among mankind is to jump from one extreme to its opposite whenever they are dissatisfied with the former. But history is not made by the unreflective. Experience can teach us that the march from thesis to antithesis and then to synthesis involves waste. The tendency of leaders of men is often, and always should be to seek the better ; but the better unless mistaken, is not the antithesis or the contradictory. Even in Hegel's dialectic, McTaggart tells us, when we go higher up the scale of categories, especially in the sphere of the Notion, the function of contradiction becomes less and less important, and the so-called antithesis becomes an advance upon the thesis, not its mere contradictory. Croce's criticism of Hegel that he confuses between contradictories and distincts, is therefore significant. Whatever may be said of the categories of unreflective knowledge, in history the process need not be dialectical.

Nor, again, need historical progress be a process from indefinite incoherent homogeneity to definite coherent heterogeneity. The process is towards an ideal which, it is expected, will bestow harmony on chaotic complexity. The moment intellect appears, the individuals begin to assert independence, and the fixed harmony of nature is destroyed. But we cannot maintain that human society is more coherent

than the society of bees. Taking history as it is, the process does not seem to be towards greater and greater coherence. The ideal is always coherence, harmony, agreement, or unity. But we cannot maintain that greater and greater unity is attained as history advances. The very idea of progress implies the presence of factors of disunity and discord, which render the full realisation of unity and concord unattainable. History exhibits a recurrent approximation to harmony and a recurrent falling into discord. It may be said that at present international problems are more occupying the minds of men than ever, and that we are beginning to realise more that humanity is a unity. But this means that the ideal of unity has become more comprehensive; it does not mean that we have greater peace and harmony than before. Coherence might have become more comprehensive, but it has not become more intense and perfect.

Because of the perpetual change of the patterns of thought and practice, there could be no single system of philosophy. Some may not like to include changing theory in philosophy. Reality, they may say, is always the same. Though the phenomenal existence changes, the depths of our being never change. And philosophy is the theory of the nature of this innermost reality. But the nature of this innermost reality, is known to us only through its manifestations, and our conception of it, therefore, undergoes continual modification. The theory that there is an innermost reality and that it expresses itself through the continual change of the phenomenal world may be expounded systematically, and may be an eternally unchanging philosophy. Yet we cannot be indifferent to the actual concrete manifestations and their relations between themselves and the innermost reality. When these manifestations are systematised, special significance in the innermost reality is discovered, and is given the definite form of a concept. Thus the significance we discover in that reality

changes with history. Hence, philosophy too, if it is not to be either sterile or restricted to mystic experience, progresses. Philosophy is concerned not merely with the question whether there is an innermost reality, but also with the question, how that reality and its manifestations are known, and are to be understood by us.

In most of the philosophies of progress the individual is not offered real consolation for his sacrifice in contributing to the progress of humanity. Professor Alexander wants to use the ideal of free cooperation towards bettering the world in its onward movement to interpret the belief in immortality, "putting in the place of supersensuous existence the continuance of the life of every one in the persons whom he may effect by word, or thought, or deed". "Like footsteps in a gallery, our lightest movements are heard along the ages". But we cannot always be consoled by this idea. The individual wants consolation in a more concrete form. The difficulty in Alexander's view is due to the absence of ideal existence, eternal and transcendent. By giving a real place to mysticism, and allowing some transcendence, we can surmount this difficulty. At every moment of history the individual is free to have his own salvation through mystic experience, while, as a being in time, he contributes to the progress of humanity.

We face the same difficulty in Croce's theory. History, as an eternal growth upon itself, progresses. But the individuals perish in the process, and are made mere instruments of progress. It is true that society contributes much to the growth of the individual's mind. Yet the individual is not a mere point of intersection of social relations. If the individual were merely such, society would have been fixed once for all and the scope for progress would have been precluded. The individual has a uniqueness of his own, which cannot be exhausted by, and is not reducible into, social relations. About dialectical materialism Professor Macmurry writes; "I can

express it (the revolutionary principle in dialectical materialism) by saying that it is the one system of philosophy that recognises the relation which necessarily exist between any philosophy whatever and the social conditions from which it arises, and which in its general form it must express."¹⁶ "The idea of pure philosophy, of a system of thought which is independent of the particular thinker who creates it and of his particular environment, is seen to be an impossibility."¹⁷ But he adds later: "Thus organic philosophies because of their preoccupation with biological concepts, will miss in this interpretation of human life precisely what distinguishes it from sub-human life. The uniqueness of the human individual will disappear from sight". "It is this that gives point to the general criticism of Dialectical Materialism—that it fails to do justice to the individual and to the freedom of the individual in society."¹⁸ The leaders of men are examples of the assertion of individuality which transcends social relations. Thus though both the Italian and the Marxian outlooks are, at present the keenest rivals in most spheres of human life, both have overlooked the rights and usefulness of the individual. The individual is treated as a mere point in the economic structure by the one, and as a mere instrument of the progress of history¹⁹ or the pure act of the transcendental ego²⁰ by the other.

The difficulty can be overcome only by rising above the conception of reality as pure process. Reality does not, and should not, exhaust itself in this process, that is, it should not wholly be immanent in the process. Not only the consideration of the place of the individual, but other considerations also have brought us to the same conclusion. Even Bergson's discussion about dynamic religion leads to the same

16. *Aspects of Dialectical Materialism*, p 32 17. *Ibid.*, p. 34

18. *Ibid.*, p. 45 19. By Croce 20. By Gentile

result. The intuition of the mystic and the leader is wider and deeper, and when perfect, includes the whole of reality. They are able to have this intuition only because they somehow transcend the pure process of evolution. If reality is wholly immanent in the process, they cannot see more than what is apparent.

Further, the idea of progress implies an "Other", which has to be moulded according to our wishes. If there is no "Other", if the whole of reality is immanent in us, there is no need and no scope for progress. To regard becoming itself as the very nature of our self does not help us in explaining progress. Our nature may be becoming, but we become nothing. We would be what we are, pure becoming. Even Fichte, in spite of the pronounced ethical interest of his philosophy, has to posit the Non-Ego in order to make moral action possible. True, Kant failed to bridge the gulf between the natural and the moral; he started with the mere object as the field of the operation of mechanical causes, and found it difficult to explain how the moral ideal can be realised, as natural laws do not respect ends and purposes. Fichte reversed the method of approach to the problem by starting with the pure Ego. This Ego is transcendental, but the empirical ego is faced by the object, which is not the ego. The transcendental Ego, we may admit for the sake of argument, creates the object which the empirical ego perceives. Thus the object would be created *for* the empirical ego and not *by* the empirical ego. That is, the creative act is performed not *by* the historical individual, but *for* the historical individual; so far as the historical individual is concerned, the perception of the object is not the same as its creation. Nor does the assertion that the transcendental Ego is the historical individual stand examination. Gentile writes: "Ever bear in mind that the 'we' which we mean when we use it as a convention in speech is not the empirical self, and is

not the scholastic compound of soul and body, not even pure mind, it is the true, the transcendental²¹ 'we'." Apart from the question whether the empirical self is a compound of soul and body, the statement that the 'we' is the transcendental Ego is open to doubt. If the transcendental Ego transcends process and time—as it must,—it is obviously not the historical individual; if on the other hand, it is the historical individual, it cannot be the transcendental Ego. This differentiation between the transcendental and the empirical ego does not exclude every relation between them. The determination of this relation is one of the chief problems of absolutism. Yet no kind of absolutism should overlook the difference between the two.

Hence, the expression "freedom of the spirit", has to be differently interpreted. When we mean by spirit the finite spirit, we mean by its freedom its ability to rise above mechanical laws. We all feel our distinctness even from our bodies. Freedom cannot mean for the finite spirit the freedom to create the objects of its perception. If such freedom were possible, there would be no need of moral action. Action is needed to produce modifications in the objects cognised. If cognition were the same as creation, cognition could have created objects as we wish them to be.

Previous to writing the *Critiques* Kant says in a letter to Herz²² that the problem, how and why the subjective concepts agree with the objective facts, is most occupying his attention. In fact, that is the problem which led him to write the *Critiques*. The way in which the problem is bronched by Kant shows that he starts with the absolute dualism of subject and object. This dualism, it has been pointed out by later philosophers, vitiates a number of the conclusions of the *Critiques*.

21. *Theory of Mind as Pure Act*, p. 41

22. Edward Caird: *The Critical Philosophy of Kant* vol I. p. 179.

It was this dualism and the consequent conception of the object as independent of the ego, that stood in the way of Kant's explaining how the ethical ideal was realisable in the world. Fichte therefore dispensed with the transcendental object and treated the object as the creation of the transcendental Ego, for the object as a creation of the Ego will conform to the ends of the empirical ego. Cognition is to serve the purpose of action. Thus the foundation is laid for the theory that even in perception the ego is free ; for after the dismissal of the transcendental object one more step will identify the transcendental Ego with the empirical ; and in fact, the identity of the two *in essence* is postulated by almost all kinds of absolutism. But we cannot lay too much emphasis on 'in essence,' so long as we belong to the world of finitude.

The idea of the ego or reason as positing the world is made use of by Hegel too in his own way. He tells us that philosophy can begin only after the liberation of the concept,—which has been accomplished for the first time in Greek philosophy. The freedom of the concept from existence is the same as the freedom of thought. He writes "So pure science presupposes deliverance from the opposition of Consciousness. Pure science includes *Thought in so far as it is just as much the Thing in itself, in so far as it is just as much pure Thought as it is the Thing in itself*. Truth, as science, is pure self-consciousness unfolding itself, and it has the form of Self in that what exists in and for itself is the known concept, while the concept as such is that which exists in and for itself."²³ Further, "the categories function only instinctively and as impulses—they are at first introduced into consciousness piecemeal, and therefore are mutable and mutually confusing, and thus yield to mind a piecemeal and insecure actuality. To justify these categories and to raise the mind

23. *Science of Logic*, Vol. I. p. 60 (English Translation by Johnston and Strugghers.)

through them to Freedom and Truth, this it is which is the loftier task of Logic."²⁴ Again, "The fact as experienced thus becomes an illustration and a copy of the original and completely self supporting activity of thought."²⁵ Though Hegel tells us that the dialectical development of the concepts is the free movement of thought, he takes the caution to remind us—though it is open to question whether he is consistent in doing so—that the categories are discovered in the course of history and are not a creation by the subject out of its mind.²⁶ But the Neo-idealists seem to go beyond Hegel in their emphasis on the freedom of the spirit. For them, philosophy is not possible without absolute freedom of spirit. "Philosophy," according to them, "would be the moment, and act by which in man spirit knows itself as Spirit, as Subject positing itself as Object."²⁷ Kant is found fault with for holding that sensations are due to an external object. As restricting the activity of the ego and thus limiting its freedom, Kant's view, it is maintained, precludes the possibility of philosophy altogether. Philosophy should be fully rational; so long as the irrational object, independent of the ego, and as the source of the sensations, is retained, complete rationality of our experience, and so philosophy, is not possible.

If we start with an independent object and an independent subject,—and we do so in our finitude—the conformity of the concepts to the objects and of the objects to the concepts raises a problem. This conformity makes us think whether it is not true that the subject contributes

24. *Ibid* p. 46.

25. Wallace : *The Logic of Hegel*, p. 22.

26. For the the relevant passages of Hegel See McI'aggart : *Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*, Sec., 33-43.

27. Angelo Crespi : *Contemporary Thought of Italy*, p. 187.

something to the being of the object. If the world is for action, and for the realisation of the ethical ideal, one with a predominant ethical interest may say, because of this contribution the subject is able to bend the object as it wishes, and to realise the ethical ideal in an object that appears to be refractory. But there is another aspect of our experience, error and evil. Their presence shows that the object is not absolutely the subject's creation, but is something created *for* the subject. If the historical individual is really purposeful, and if it is in his power to create objects conforming to his purpose, there is no reason why he should create error and evil. It is not a sufficient explanation to say that he continuously overcomes error and evil, and their root lies in the very nature of his mind, which is 'becoming'. That is, progress or becoming consists, it may be said, in the continual committal of error and the creation of evil and the continual correction and overcoming of them. But this view conflicts with the nature of the individual as purposeful. We are conscious of our purposes; and when it lies within our power to create objects which serve our ends, we do not create objects which hinder us in realising our ends. The difficulty found in Kant, namely, that he is not able to explain how the ethical end can be realised if the object is separate from the subject obliges us only to postulate some relation that enters deep into their being, but not to admit that the object should be the creation of the subject. Philosophy of course must be rational in the sense that it should attempt to understand our experience; but for this purpose it cannot make the world more rational than it actually is. Philosophy, so far as we know, is the activity of the finite spirit, whose experience includes both irrational and supra-rational elements; and we doubt very much whether there could be any philosophy at the level of the transcendental Ego or the Absolute.

We may accept that the transcendental Ego, in a sense, creates the objects for us. 'The modification 'in a sense' is added, because here we cannot escape the question, why and with what purpose, if that Ego is full, it creates the objects. Yet we can accept the view in the sense that both the object and the empirical ego have a common source and somehow emanate from it. From our point of view we are obliged to trace both the subject and the object to a common origin, and treat the origin as somehow akin to the subject in order to account for the conformity between it and the object. If the transcendental Ego 'creates' the object as a field of action and with an end in view, it 'creates' both the subjects and the objects with some conformity between them, while at the same time allowing each some independence. If this independence is not allowed, the presence of error and evil cannot satisfactorily be explained. For this reason, the attempts of some philosophers to treat subject and object as only two aspects of a concrete whole will be found to be unsatisfactory, because, then, there could be no scope for error and evil. As a mere coordinate aspect of the object the subject cannot feel the shortcomings of the object. To feel them it must experience the stirrings within of something deeper and higher, and must pass beyond the object. Hegel's view that thought passes beyond the object is therefore to the point and is not the mere outcome of any leanings towards subjectivism. He writes: "As the idea is (a) process, it follows that such an expression of the Absolute as unity of thought and being, of finite and infinite, etc., is false; for unity expresses an abstract and merely quiescent identity. As the Idea is (b) subjectivity it follows that the expression is equally false on that account. That unity of which it speaks expresses a merely virtual or underlying presence of the genuine unity. The infinite would thus seem to be merely *neutralised* by the finite, the subjective by the objective, thought by being. But in the negative unity of the Idea, the

infinite overlaps and includes the finite, thought overlaps being, subjectivity overlaps objectivity".²⁸ But the subjectivity that overlaps objectivity is transcendental, not empirical, and testifies to some self-transcendence within the empirical subject. It means that the transcendental Ego is somehow continuous with the empirical ego and akin to it. Because of this self-transcendence, which is transcendence of the phenomenal existence the empirical subject is able to feel the defects of the object.

For the same reason, the attempt to derive the subject from the object will break down, when the question of values and ideals is considered. Professor Whitehead writes: "Thus for Kant the process whereby there is experience is a process from subjectivity to apparent objectivity. The philosophy of organism inverts this analysis, and explains the process as proceeding from objectivity to subjectivity, namely, from the objectivity, whereby the external world is a datum, to the subjectivity, whereby there is one individual experience".²⁹ But as derived from the object, the subject cannot contain within it anything more than what is given to it from the object. It cannot know anything which is better than the object, cannot set an ideal against it or distinguish between fact and value.

Can the idea of progress throw any light on the nature of the ideal? In the historical process we find both theory and practice progressing equally through mutual influence. Is the ideal perfect practice or perfect theory? Is it mere contemplation or is it pure activity? Aristotle tells us that God is pure activity, yet He is thought of thought, pure Contemplation. Kant postulates intuitive understanding as the Ideal of Reason, which creates while perceiving. Hegel

28. Wallace : *The Logic of Hegel*, pp. 357-8.

29. *Process and Reality* p. 217.

also extols contemplative life as the ideal in which free conceptual thought creates the forms while contemplating them. And the emphasis by the Italian Idealists on the identity of history and philosophy falls in a line with the above views. It is the identity of pure activity or becoming with contemplation. The first point for consideration is that, if the ideal is both contemplation and activity, whether it does not transcend both, and whether it is not either contemplation or pure activity or both together. It may be said that history itself is the identity of thought and action. But we have shown that history, as purposive activity, is not possible without a transcendent ideal, and history itself cannot be that ideal. Now contemplation is static and activity dynamic; unless the ideal transcends both, they contradict each other and result in nothing. Next, as we have already seen, this ideal cannot be a historical fact; for the historical individual is limited by an "Other". Hence we are led to accept some form of mystic experience as the revealer of the nature of the ideal. And as the mystic experience is always ineffable, the ideal too must be so. Its nature must transcend conceptual thought.

Now to sum up. Human progress implies an ideal, which is both transcendent and immanent. Only because of its transcendence is endless history possible. Even Green's view that the content of the moral ideal is progressively determined³⁰ can be really significant only on the admission of this transcendence. That time will never come, when the whole of the ideal's content will have been determined; for from that moment progress and history will cease. Moreover, the content of the ideal cannot completely be determined; it would be beyond the powers of humanity to determine it, because of its inexhaustible detail. So the history of humanity must be interpreted as a perpetual attempt to keep the ideal trans-

30. *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 254.

parent in its activity. In this progress theory and practice mutually influence each other. Value is distinct from historical fact, and this distinction is essential for progress. Progress is neither merely cyclical, nor merely spiral, nor merely in a line ; it need not be dialectical, nor is humanity becoming more and more coherent. Coherence has become, if at all, wider, but not deeper. Further, the idea of progress implies an "Other", the object is not the subject's creation. Full realisation of the transcendent ideal is possible in mystic experience ; and like the mystic experience the ideal too is ineffable, it transcends conceptual thought. In each epoch of history, it is given some distinct conceptual form, and becomes the guiding principle. But the finitude inherent in every conceptual form renders it incapable of performing all the functions required of it, when it becomes bankrupt and gives place to another concept, which, again, is a different form assumed, in the course of history, by the same transcendent ideal. Nor need humanity have a single history. Every nation has its own history and its epochs with their leading ideas. Yet different histories may converge and form a single history, as we find it now ; but there is no *a priori* necessity that this unified history must, as such, continue.

The Philosophical Implications of Evolution.

By

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The concept of evolution originated in the field of biology as a description of the way in which diverse forms of life have come to be what they are. It put out of court the view that species were fixed and unchanging and that the innumerable kinds of living beings were directly created in the forms in which we find them to-day, and asserted that the amazing diversity of living forms has sprung from more or less primitive organisms. The opposition to Darwinism, once very vehement, has died down, because the factors that prompted men to oppose it furiously were the extreme novelty of the evolution idea, and its supposed religious and moral consequences. While there is considerable difference of opinion among the leading biologists regarding the causes or the machinery by which new species have arisen in the course of ages, there is no doubt that evolution has occurred in the organic realm. No biologist of importance denies the fact of evolution.

The theory of evolution is not susceptible of direct proof; the opening scenes of the cosmic drama are not going to be re enacted in order to enable us to see what took place several millions of years ago. But it is as well proven as any hypothesis of science. The enormous wealth of evidence that Darwin himself adduced and the vast range of knowledge of animate nature that experimental workers have accumulated during the last seventy-five years bear out, in an impressive manner, this theory. Evidence from diverse fields of science—

embryology, comparative anatomy, physiology, paleontology, and geology—converge upon this one hypothesis. It is extraordinary that no single fact that can be said to be, even in a remote way, contradictory to it has been discovered. Seeing how it fits facts and renders intelligible several obscure facts of biology, men have not been slow in applying the general idea of evolution to every department of human thought. In fact, evolution is the master-key with which to unlock the mysteries of animate nature. At first a biological principle, it has been extended to the inorganic sphere. In the face of these far-reaching applications of the general conception of evolution, it becomes necessary to inquire into its implications.

Any change will not amount to evolution or development. Evolution implies orderly change, change directed towards ends, a becoming in which what as yet in some sense is not is brought into being, a process marked by the birth of novelty. In a word, evolution is purposive, teleological. The concepts of progress and degeneration employed in the biological sciences indicate that the evolutionary process is relative to the end to be attained. For biology all change is either in the direction of progress or in that of retrogression, an advance to a higher or a descent to a lower level. Despite the set-backs and blind-alleys, evolution stands for a gradual development of more complicated and more efficient organisms from those that are comparatively simple and less efficient. From simple sentence to the most highly organised mind there is a processive development.

Once the teleological character of evolution is admitted, it follows that a thorough-going evolutionary philosophy must be inconsistent with mechanistic materialism; for, the latter rules out teleology from its scheme, and maintains that the conception of nature as marked by development is a human delusion. The cosmos is the outcome of the dance of material particles, the ultimate building materials of the world,

moving blindly and fortuitously, without any aim or direction. Fortuitous changes in matter will only constitute a mere succession of changes, which are in no sense true developments. Mechanistic materialism obliterates the distinction between organic and inorganic nature and thinks that life is merely a function or quality of matter, and that vital operations are of the same character as those investigated in dynamics. Equating vitalism with mystery, materialism asserts that the only escape from mystery is by renouncing vitalism. How one phase of matter or of life passed into another is sought to be explained in terms of material elements and the laws of their combination. Since the animal body contains no material not found in the inorganic realm, it is argued that there is no immaterial factor in the organism; life appears only in association with chemical elements, such as oxygen, hydrogen, and nitrogen bathed in light, heat and so on. Just as non-living matter has somehow given rise to living matter, living matter of a sufficient degree of complexity gives birth to mind. Purposeless variations sifted by purposeless selection is said to account for the rich variety of living forms. Mind itself, when it has appeared upon the scene of the earth, is no more than a bye-product, which makes no difference to the go of events. The cosmos is a realm of purely mechanical events. The more hopeful among the experimental biologists believe that, within a reasonably short time, the physical basis of heredity would have been discovered and the architecture of the germ-cells completely revealed and vitalism given a decent burial.

As a methodological fiction, the refusal to employ the teleological conception in scientific investigation has something to be said in its favour. But, if the ban on teleology is the result of excursions into the region of philosophy, it must be strenuously opposed. In spite of the rapidly accumulating knowledge of cell-anatomy, it is not possible to

destroy the boundary separating the organic from the inorganic region. While it is by no means certain that there are purposes underlying changes in inert matter, it is obvious that organic changes imply purposeful guidance. Given material elements and physico-chemical laws it may be possible to understand the several phases through which material structures pass; but they would be wholly inadequate to explain how life progresses from one stage to another.

Again, life may commonly find expression and embodiment in material structure; and on this account life cannot be identified with matter or deduced therefrom. Because a great play or a fine piece of music needs printed words or musical instruments for their expression, the great play or the exquisite melody is not identified respectively with printed words or with musical instruments. Printed words and musical instruments are but the mechanism through which the organisation of the play or the music is expressed. The case of the animal organism is quite similar. Life uses and shapes the body for its purposes, just as a skilful musician utilises the delicate musical instrument. Even if the laboratory worker some day succeeds in manufacturing life from highly evolved chemical substances, he would still have shown only what chemical substances are best fitted for receiving life. The distinction between matter and life is fundamental. The choice is certainly not between materialism and mystery, but between one mystery and another.

There is no creative synthesis in the physical order, there being mere arrangement and rearrangement of matter involving quantitative rather than qualitative differences. Hence, in respect of the inorganic world there is no development in the proper sense of the term. The organic realm alone gives evidence of purposeful change, of real coming to be. Animate nature is a realm of ends. Mind is no spectator of events, having no influence on what he witnesses. It does

make a difference to the go of events. Contemporary psychology is making ample amends for its past neglect of conative and teleological facts by being engrossed in the scientific study of teleological factors, such as, drives, incentives, propensities and motivation. Organic evolution proceeds along definable and describable lines of advance. The process is towards more complex structures and increased inter-dependence of parts, towards increasing power of adaptation and greater plasticity.

During recent years several attempts have been made to present a philosophy of evolution, which, while adhering to strict scientific principles of explanation, would rescue mind from the position of a by-product of the dance of material particles to which it has been reduced, accommodate purpose in the world, recognise that the evolutionary process is throughout marked by the incessant appearance of new things, new relations new powers, and new qualities, and find, if possible, room for God. Emergent Evolution, Creative Evolution, Holism, Creative Synthesis, Evolutionary Naturalism and other allied philosophical constructions are more or less agreed on describing the universe as a pyramid of four or more ascending levels or orders of existence. Non-living things come at the lowest level; living things, at the next higher level; sentient beings, at a still higher stage; and rational creatures, at the topmost level. The different levels of being are not wholly disparate; each level of existence is said to pass into that which is above it by strictly natural causes. Every antecedent change is the cause of the subsequent change; and yet, at each stage, there is emergence of novelty. By an analysis of the antecedents of an event, we cannot predict what qualities will emerge. From an incomprehensible and mysterious Space-Time, or electrons and protons or some unknown matrix of matter, which tenanted cosmic space at an inconceivably remote past, all the complicat-

ed forms of chemical substances, life and mind have emerged. Perhaps, in the future, other emergents of even greater moment are to follow. Gestalt or configuration, organic synthesis, Creative synthesis, organismic conception and kindred notions, showing that the whole contains properties not previously realised in the parts composing it, have been pressed into service by these modern movements of thought in accounting for the emergent properties.

Emergence proves nothing. It tries to eat the cake and still have it. Why have the different kinds of reality and the ascending scale of values appeared in this orderly succession? What makes the emergents emerge? The answers are—the directive activity of God, the continuous *nisus* towards the Deity or towards whole-making. The doctrine of emergence dispels the mystery of Creation, at a remote period, of separate kinds only to make room for another—the mystery of the perpetual creation of novelty. How life proceeds from physico-chemical synthesis and how, again, mind is derived from mindless, pure sentience, is as inexplicable here as on the Theory of natural kinds. The only way of escape is by smuggling something of life and mind into the physical universe from which mind is alleged to have emerged. The physical atom must be fitted with life and the amoeba with a mental structure. Lloyd-Morgan does not hesitate to utilise this remedy. He grafts the Spinozistic doctrine of the twofold attributes of a single reality on to his doctrine of emergence, and complicates it still further by the addition of the principle of unrestricted concomitance, which asserts that where there is life there is also mind. If mind is everywhere and at all times, and if matter and spirit are the inseparable attributes of the one real, there is really no emergence at all. There is only the progressive development of what was there all the time, but in an implicit form. Like the conjuror who produces the mango plant, fruit and all, from an empty hand, the emergent

evolutionists derive life and mind from a lifeless, mindless, world. And, like the mango plant and fruit, life and mind are either a sham, in which case, emergence is a meaningless word, or they are real, in which case, they were there all the time and emergence is a fake. Thus, we are thrown back on a dualism of mind and matter. While one part of nature exhibits changes which cannot be said to be evolution in the proper sense of the word, the other manifestly and indisputably develops. The terms used to describe inorganic changes are wholly inadequate to describe organic activities.

Starting with a strictly physical universe, the materialists are hard put to it for an explanation of life, mind and other emergents. Hence, they are forced to deny that anything genuinely new emerges. The theory of preformation, the doctrine that what arises in the later stages of the evolutionary process were there 'stored up' in the earlier phases is no solution at all. Emergent evolution recognises that there is a progressive advance from lower to higher orders of existence, that there is the birth of novelty; but it fails to solve the problem of the relation of the emergent properties to the antecedent conditions. Somehow the emergents are imported into the antecedents themselves. If the emergents were not there already, they cannot be deduced, not even by the magic word 'emergence'; if they were there, there is no real emergence. In one sense, evolution implies that the later and earlier phases are not the same, and that real coming to be of something which prior to its production did not exist in the manner in which it exists after it has come into existence. In another sense, surely, it must have existed; for else it cannot be called development. Thus, we are led to believe that something implicit or imperfectly revealed in earlier organisms is more fully revealed in later. In other words, what is potential becomes actual. Just because what is implicit or potentially present in anything

is not known until it is actualised, it cannot be said that it was not implicit.

Evolution implies the presence of a permanent entity underlying the series of progressive changes. The earlier and later phases in a connected series are not the same; but they belong alike to the evolving entity. Thus, underlying the several series of changes, there must be a plurality of evolving entities. The developing entity must be finite. The Infinite cannot develop; for, development is possible only when there is an environment to supply the conditions of development and to provide incentives to change; and the Absolute can have no environment. Again, the temporal succession involved in evolution cannot apply to him. Only that which is as yet in imperfect possession of its ends can advance toward it. The plurality of ultimately independent reals, through the various external disguises assumed move progressively upward.

Change is inconceivable apart from time. Struggle for goodness, and suffering in the service of righteousness are not mere appearances in a world of illusions. They are means whereby new values are created. If the evolutionary struggle is real and of ethical significance, life in time is no delusion. Absolutist philosophies that make the world process phenomenal must make the evolutionary process a phantom fight, and reduce science to a pursuit of shadows.

Facts of evolution are not antagonistic to, but consonant with, a religious interpretation of the world. Given fortuitous variations, the purely mechanical process of Natural Selection may account for the rise of all species of plants and animals with all their marvellous adaptations. But what causes the variations, the raw materials on which Natural Selection can work? Natural Selection is itself not a creative agency for bringing variations into existence; it does not create variations any more than the sieve can make the things

it sifts. The incompleteness of the evolutionary picture that includes only chance variations and natural selection is apparent. Evolution does not deny creation ; it only defines the method of creation. The 'grand strategy of nature' may be His way of bringing about creation. He may be called the Lord of evolution. Thus, the picture of finite agents evolving from lower to higher levels needs for its completion an Infinite Spirit. As finite individuals alone develop and as God cannot be said to evolve, God is beyond the evolving process. He is still no spirit beyond the stars, who started the process going and is content to leave it over afterwards to proceed its own way. Cosmic catastrophes, degeneration, ugliness and loathsome diseases, which necessarily strike us as being wholly evil, tend to weaken belief in God. If, in the manner of Paley, the wonderful adaptations displayed by species to environmental conditions are said to speak for the existence of an all-wise, almighty Designer, the more numerous cases of misfits would eloquently establish that the controller of the world drama, if there is one, is a hopeless bungler. Several species of animals possess characters that are of little value to their possessor ; and innumerable species of animals have become extinct. The evolutionary process is not one of uniform development from the lower to the higher ; it is as often for the worse as for the better ; it creates not only strong, intelligent and beautiful creatures, but also degenerate parasites. In fact, retrogression is as frequent a phenomenon as progression. Barnacles and oysters have lost their movement and brains ; the free-living crustacea have become parasites and have become a source of considerable pain to other creatures. Blake found it hard to imagine that God created the tiger. But the tiger is a splendid fellow when compared with blood-thirsty land-licees, mosquitoes and several types of microbes. To these and to several other similar considerations the reply is that suffering has a disci-

plinary value and is indispensable for the fashioning of the moral life. True, God cannot be freed altogether from the responsibility for the nature of His creatures. Yet, the moral evil in the world, which He could have prevented, but has chosen not to check, could be explained by the fact of His having created finite centres of activity, who enjoy some degree of freedom. Why He has allowed freedom to finite personalities is a question concerning His ultimate designs. Who can justify the ways of God to man? The contemplation on the mysteries of the creative activity leaves a profound conviction of the limitations of human thought.

The Philosophical Implications of Evolution.

BY

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Fifty years ago the doctrine of evolution meant practically the doctrine of descent in living creatures. But within recent years it has acquired a more generalised significance. A number of scientists have begun to speak of the evolution of the solar system, the Alps, the Mediterranean sea ; of plants and animals ; of social institutions ; of scientific thought or artistic expression.¹ There has been, for them, as real an evolution of the atoms as there has been of organisms. All these have much in common. In none of them is there any fixity or stability ; in all of them there is rhythmic and orderly change. In none of them does the course of evolution proceed steadily in one direction. On the contrary, it commonly seems to proceed from states of less complexity to states of greater complexity and then to revert to states of less complexity². Though for many

1. 'The Great Design : Essay on "Behold the Stars" by Robert Grant Aitken, P. 19.

Creation by Evolution—Essay on "Mind in Evolution" by C. Lloyd Morgan P. 340, p 35.

2. *Ibid.* Cumulative Evidence For Evolution by Horatio Heckett Newman P. 355.

scientists, evolution has thus ceased to be merely a concept of biology and has become the concept of Nature, yet its meaning seems to be far too restricted. The extension of its meaning so as to apply to every aspect of human life is clearly indicated by the developing sciences of anthropology, sociology and comparative religion.

The conception has gained in meaning yet in another respect. As Henry Fairfield Osborne has observed: Evolution is far more than the unfolding of something that already exists, as the germ develops and unfolds in the beauty of a rose; evolution the incessant appearance of new qualities, new characters, new powers, new beauties, for which there is no antecedent in experience or no evident promise in the germ itself"³. There is indeed creation in evolution, but it is not a single fiat of creation, but a perpetual procession of creations. "To-day is created anew from yesterday. One second gives birth to a fresh and different succeeding second, and yet between them an enduring linkage occurs. While it is not difficult to coin phrases, to describe and summarise this remarkable development, and perhaps the term creative evolution is the most helpful, yet we must avoid the common blunder of confusing a name with a cause."⁴

Though everything evolves, yet everything is not uniform. There was once a marked tendency among scientists and philosophers to reduce everything to one category, either matter or mind. But to-day Occam's razor is not so blindly applied. Scientists have come to realise that there are several irreducible factors in experience. Matter, life and mind are such irreducibles. We can no more reduce mind to matter than we can reduce matter to mind. Evolution is therefore not

3. *Ibid.* P. ix.

4. The Great Design—Essay on "The Universe As a Whole" by A. S. Eve. p. 85.

the same throughout. The evolution of matter is not the same as the evolution of life, nor is the evolution of mind the same as the evolution of life. Material processes give rise to new forms without giving rise to new forces.⁵ Addition of new powers and new properties is distinctive attribute of life. Life is a stream that flows up-hill; its power is insurgent. It is more or less self-adapting, self-regenerating, self-modifying, self-resourceful, self-experimental, self-creative. Individuality, adaptiveness, reproduction, metabolism, growth and variation are among its other characteristics⁶. At the lower levels life is guided mostly by instinct, but as we go up to higher levels intelligent guidance becomes far more evident.

Some scientists would like to characterise evolution as upward advance. But they should not be understood as maintaining that advance is the only thing that the cosmic process illustrates. Side by side with advance there is regress. Dissolution and breaking down are met with here and there on the vital and mental levels and more often on the material level; but building up is, on the whole, the dominant tendency. As Lloyd Morgan well sums it up: "Falls to lower levels there are; but rise to higher status has won through. Our thesis is the prevalence of evolution."⁷ Lloyd Morgan is not alone in asserting the progressive character of evolution. In this he has the support of J. A. Thompson and Julian Sorell Huxley. For Thompson, evolution holds forth "a picture of an advancement of life by continuous natural stages without haste, without rest. No doubt there have been blind alleys, side tracks, lost races, parasitisms and retrogressions but on the whole there has been progress." J. S. Huxley after enumerating several facts of advance like increase in size, improvement in organs, improvement in the relation between organs, improvement in the control exercised by the brain, increase of

5. *Ibid* p. x.6. *Ibid* p. 57. *Ibid* p. 346.

emotional power and of purposive action, concludes that it is "justifiable, to speak of the observed movement of life that we have so far called biological advance as real biological progress"⁸.

Some scientists have gone still further and have asserted that evolution spells purposive design. A striking sign of the times is that an abnormally large number of scientists have become defenders of the faith. Eddington and Jeans, Thompson and Jordon, Huxley and Newman avow that evolution definitely reveals 'a power not ourselves that makes for righteousness' and 'a God-head infinitely worthy of obedience and adoration'.

Such a friendly attitude towards religion and spiritual values as it is evidenced by the pronouncements of scientists is certainly better than their avowed antagonism. But while such stray and unsystematised statements have no philosophic value, they may work incalculable harm in so far as those who make their living by religion may exploit them to perpetuate unhealthy ecclesiastical dogmas and practices. This does not, however, mean that scientists should not enter the domain of philosophy or that they are incapable of becoming philosophers. But they should not expect their stray statements to be taken for serious philosophy or believed to be true just because they are made by them. We can no more rely on the testimony of scientists than we can rely on that of scripture. We can attach value only to serious attempts at systematising the implications of evolution, whether such attempts have been made by scientists or philosophers. Of such attempts contemporary philosophy is full, but the most notable ones are those of Henri Bergson, S. Alexander, Lloyd Morgan and A. N. Whitehead. Considerations of time forbid me from taking a cursory glance at them. Whatever else they have done or not done, it must be laid to their credit that all of

8. *Ibid* p. 335.

them have succeeded in showing that evolution is not a mechanical but a creative process. Accepting creativity as inherent in evolution, I shall try to develop its implications.

(1) The adoption of the evolutionary outlook in philosophy precludes us from taking a merely humanistic view of life and being. To the evolutionist man cannot be the measure of the universe, for the simple reason that the universe was not made for man. Man cannot be represented as the apex of the evolutionary pyramid. The course of evolution is not linear but divergent. It can be best represented by means of the image of a wide-spreading tree—the branches representing the several lines of evolution of plant, animal, human forms. The human line is one of its branches and it is possible that other branches may emerge. The adoption of the humanistic standpoint not only dwarfs and distorts our cosmic vision, but also dulls and deadens our sense of higher values. Leave alone the emergence of the superman; too much stress laid on man will involve us in a climb-down to the sub-man.

(2) The evolutionary outlook also precludes us from accepting any kind of theism. Theism is the logical implication of humanism. God, the saviour is the partisan of man and his sole business is to minister to the needs of man. The Doctrine of Grace which Christians, Vaishnavites and Saivite theologians hold forth as the very cream of theism does not do credit either to the divinity of God or to the self-respect of man. If we should believe in any spiritual principle, evolution requires that such a principle should be characterised as a "that" rather than as a "He". This does not mean that the spirit is to be identified with matter. It can be identified neither with matter nor with man, though both of them are forms of it. Such a spirit evokes a keener sense of kinship of man with nature than any theism can. The fact that both inorganic nature and organic nature have striven for countless ages to make possible man not only fills man's heart with a

feeling of kinship and gratitude, it obliges him seriously to strive after a higher level of life than his own⁹

(3) Does evolution imply an end? Does it point to any purpose? Evolution does not point to any conscious goal or end. The urge for expression that we find everywhere has rhythm, orderliness and unity, but the rhythm, orderliness and unity are not everywhere such as we find them in conscious human behaviour. We can even speak of evolution acting under the compulsion of norms, if we could divest the term 'norm' of its human associations. There is a tendency on the part of everything to conform to a norm or pattern internal to itself. For example, crystals of copper sulphate tend to conform to an ideal pattern. Similarly trees, birds and beasts have all ideal patterns to which they tend to conform. Man also acts according to the same law, but he does so from the consciousness of it. Though everything may be said to act under an ideal impulse, yet the form which each takes is different from that which others assume and reality as a whole

9. A sacred kinship I would not forego
 Binds me to all that breathes ;...
 I am the child of earth and air and sea.
 My lullaby by hoarse Silurian storms forms
 Was chanted, and through endless changing
 Of tree and bird and beast unceasingly
 The toiling ages wrought to fashion me.
 Lo ! these large ancestors have left a breath
 Of their great souls in mine, defying death
 And change. I grow and blossom as the tree,
 And ever feel deep-delving earthly roots
 Binding me closely to the common clay ;
 Yet with its airy impulse upward shoots
 My soul into the realms of light and day !

Hjalmar Hjorth Boyesen.

cannot be described in terms of any one of them. The besetting sin of Materialism, Vitalism and Humanism is to make the norm peculiar to one phase of reality definitive of reality as a whole. The whole trend of modern philosophy which began with a subjectivistic note in Descartes has been to find the key to reality in self-consciousness. As a reaction against this anthropocentric standpoint, philosophers like Alexander have set out to de-anthropomorphise philosophy. Both these standpoints are equally unsound. The proper standpoint to take is to seek to interpret experience in terms of a general principle which is expressive of matter, life and consciousness but is not identical with any. Such a principle is the principle of self-transcendence. Everything conforms to this, in so far as everything is tending to become more and more of itself. While inorganic and organic beings conform to it unconsciously, man alone has the capacity to conform to it consciously and deliberately. If we should speak of ends and purposes it can only be with reference to ourselves. We cannot project these ends and purposes into reality as a whole, without doing violence to its other aspects.

(4) Does evolution imply progress? Evolution would imply progress if we could conceive of it in the image of a staircase. But evolution does not support the staircase view of reality. There are norms—conscious and unconscious; but they are divergent and not convergent. There can be evaluation only as between expressions of the same norm; as between divergent norms evaluation is impossible. We can speak of a well formed crystal of copper sulphate as being more progressive than an ill-formed crystal of copper sulphate; but we cannot speak of a mangrove tree as being better formed or more progressive than a crystal of copper sulphate. The two are incommensurables. It is however usual to speak of the sprout as higher than the clod, the animal as higher than the plant, man as higher than the animal, and the Deity as higher than

man. But this is against the spirit of evolution. If evolution meant change towards one supreme end, it should have stopped evolving at the lower stages. But evolution is still going on at the lower stages. Evolution is as divergent as ever and the spirit is revelling in diversity of expressions. If evolution is the expression of the creative urge, and if creativity is the characteristic feature of divinity, we shall have to look upon everything as divine. The world of space-time is no less divine than the world of life and consciousness. It would be divine even if some of these worlds disappeared. It is creative from the first to the last; it is the same in the tiniest of tiny things and in the mightiest of mighty things. It is out of the creative urge that things are born; by it, when born, they are maintained; and into it, they pass, when they cease to exist. Creative evolution is movement from the full to the full. As the Upaniṣad says: "This is full, that is full, from the full the full arises. Take away the full from the full; the full alone remains."

Though the creative spirit may be said to revel in a diversity of forms yet it should not be considered to be confined to any or all of them. It revels in diversity of forms because it is able to rise above them. The tendency to transcend forms is as much inherent in the creative spirit as the tendency to give rise to them. Often it is forgotten that these are inseparable, and they are erected into two different entities. By some the tendency to self-transcendence is identified with Nirguṇa Brahman and that to self-expression is identified with Saṁguṇa Brahman. The one is looked upon as impersonal and the other is looked upon as personal. By others the two are looked upon as the higher and lower aspects of Brahman. Both these views are philosophically untenable. There is only one creative spirit and its reality consists as much in giving rise to forms as in transcending them. In fact, it can be the one because it is the other and vice versa. What holds good

of expression in forms holds good of expression in time. The creative spirit expresses itself in time, but it cannot do so without surpassing time ; it expresses itself through the finite, but it cannot do so without transcending it.

(5) Does evolution imply freedom ? Yes, but freedom in a sense quite different from what we usually understand by it. By freedom, we usually mean the capacity to choose. This sort of freedom is peculiar to human beings only. But freedom could be understood in quite another sense. Freedom is not getting involved in one's own reflection or expression. A man could be free in the former sense without attaining liberation. Hence real freedom is freedom in the second sense. It is in this sense that the universal spirit may be said to be free. The creative spirit is ever active in expressing itself in a diversity of forms, but it is never caught up in its own forms ; it does not suffer from Narcissism ; it does not fall in love with its forms and is therefore always blissful. Man feels bound and is unhappy because he is trying to reverse the rule of the universe. Though born of the universal he identifies himself with a series of expressions of himself in space and time, which constitute his ego. The ego is taken to be richer than his real self. While the cosmic process is one of enjoyment through renunciation, man alone tries to enjoy through greed of accumulation. In this, most men are trying to achieve the impossible. A poet enjoys his life as a poet so long as he throws himself whole-heartedly into the creation of a poem and turns away from it soon after it is produced. Instead of turning away from it, if he ties himself to it and keeps on admiring it, he is lost to himself as a poet. What applies to artistic expression applies also to expression in the field of morality, science and religion. Man feels free so long as he is not caught up in his own actions—even in those that we consider to be good. If instead, he goes on attaching himself to every one of his deeds, the burden

of his deeds goes on increasing. This is the truth of the time-honoured doctrine of *niṣkāmakarma*. It is so old and yet so refreshingly new. It is wrongly rendered as disinterested action. Disinterested action is psychologically absurd ; there can be no action without interest. *Niṣkāmakarma* is not activity without interest ; it is action in which one is intensely interested but to which one does not attach oneself. He is a free man, who, in spite of acting with intense zest, is not involved in it.

Unless one is possessed of this sense of freedom which creative expression implies, one cannot face the fact of death with equanimity. The more one attaches oneself to what should be transcended, the more does one feel like a miser who clings to what he has earned. On the other hand, the man who does not attach himself to his actions finds in death a deliverance as well as a resurrection. Death is an aspect of creative evolution ; it is a method whereby the universal spirit renews itself. To this law of the spirit man cannot prove an exception.

(6) Evolution teaches us to taste the joy of immortality in the face of death and it makes us look upon the heaven that scriptures hold before dying humanity as a world of day-dreams. Real immortality is realising freedom here and now ; it is realising in time what surpasses time ; it is realising in this body what surpasses the body.

The conception of immortality to which evolution gives rise differs from the Christian conception in another respect. Christianity allows immortality only to man and it looks upon it as inherent in him. There is a sense in which immortality is inherent. It is inherent in every one in so far as every one has it in him to achieve it. But this is not the sense in which immortality is generally understood. It is said that immortality is inherent in the sense that every one does attain it, sooner or later. A study of the evolutionary process obliges

one to think that immortality is an achievement, not a gift. What can be conserved will alone be saved, not everything. We cannot treat man as an exception. Space-time, matter, life and consciousness are all such values that have been saved. Only such species have been saved as have proved their value. The same applies to man also. He will be saved who conserves values, and to the extent to which he conserves them.

(7) More important than the metaphysical and religious implications of evolution are its social and political implications. The study of the evolution of society has shown us that change is the normal and necessary condition of life, and that social phenomena could be brought under the conscious control of man. It is becoming increasingly clear that most of the social conflicts and evils are mainly home-made and they can only be solved by reconstructing society on sound biological and psychological principles. The problem of democracy cannot be solved merely by devising a constitution. With a society largely constituted of sub-normal men and women, even the most cleverly conceived democratic constitution will not work. In order that democracy may succeed eugenic and educational reforms must keep pace with parliamentary reform. Again, problems of Labour and Capital, War and Peace cannot be solved until research in the biological, psychological and sociological sciences keeps pace with research in physics and chemistry. Evolutionary philosophy will not tolerate any kind of soft sentimentalism. It will not look upon poverty, weakness, ignorance and helplessness as marks of divinity and encourage them. The lit light, the girt loins, health and radiance, wisdom, justice and enlightened love are the qualities that are consistent with the spirit of human evolution. If our birth and growth do not come under intelligent social control, these qualities cannot be conserved. Only such life should be conserved as can conserve values.

The population of the world has increased in quantity, but there has not been a proportionate increase in quality . With such disparity between quantity and quality, social control and social conservation become impossible of achievement, and civilization and peace will be but names. If natural selection is the operative principle in the evolution of animals, intelligent selection should be the operative principle in the evolution of man. Birth and growth, marriage and parenthood, charity and punishment, education and industry, the State and the Church should all be brought under intelligent selection. Otherwise the survival of the human race will become a matter of serious doubt.

The Philosophical Implications of Evolution.

BY

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In discussing the philosophical implications of Evolution one has to commit very nearly what the logicians call the Fallacy of Many Questions : the writer has to take the fact of evolution for granted. When the theory was originally propounded the main objection came from the orthodox people who could not persuade themselves to believe that the *Genesis* account of Creation was wrong and that, instead of being created in six days, the universe has assumed its present form in millions and millions of years. They were less sophisticated than a later generation which wanted to justify the *Genesis* account by suggesting that a Divine day might be equivalent to many millions of worldly years just as in Hindu belief the year of Brahmā is many times the year of a human being. But even among those who believed in Evolution there were a few notable scientists who, following the Cartesian tradition, made a distinction between the human soul and the rest of creation and, while accepting the origin of all things through gradual changes, made an exception in the case of the rational soul of man and ascribed its origin to direct Divine creation. It is well known that Wallace, the co-discoverer with Darwin of the Law of Evolution, refused to accept the Darwinian explanation of the origin of man in so far as it related to the spiritual or rational element of the human soul. Darwin whose own speculations were limited to the evolution of the various forms of living beings did not concern himself with the origin of life in the universe and had no objection to suggest in his

Origin of Species that God might have breathed the breath of life into the first cell out of which subsequently by variation and evolution the later complex forms arose. But in his *Descent of man* he set his face against a separate origin of the human mind and applied to the problem of the descent of man the same principle of small insensible variation as he had accepted for the origin of the other forms of life.

The subsequent history of Evolution is connected with the problems raised by Darwin about the mode of Evolution. It is only in recent years that the theory itself has been challenged not on Biblical but on scientific grounds ; but the discerning reader can easily make out that in much of contemporary Neo-Scholastic criticism of the Evolution theory although the voice is that of Jacob the hand is that of Esau. We may ignore the anti-Evolution legislation of some of the states of the U. S. A. and the banning of the teaching of Evolution there ; for truth and falsity cannot be decided by votes in a legislative council and by people who are not competent to pass a judgment on the merits of the case. The trump card in the hands of the anti-evolutionists is the difficulty of proving evolution by experience for the evolutionist thinks almost in terms of astronomical years and not of centuries and millennia when he claims that time produces a change in the constitution and qualities of biological species. The Mutation theory which undertook to show a visible transformation of species in the *Oenothera Lamarckiana* obviated the difficulty raised by the imperfection of the geological record, on which Darwin had to rely to explain breaks in the evolutionary series, and also by the amount of time needed to evolve the extant species, which on the basis of the Darwinian theory would exceed the age of the world. It could explain the first by pointing out that variation is not continuous and as such the missing links are much less in number than Darwin needed for his theory, and the second by demanding much

less time for the evolution of the different species than Darwin did. But subsequent development of the theory has not unequivocally supported the theory of mutation and some have even suggested that the *Oenothera Lamarckiana* was a hybrid which broke up into distinct species in accordance with the Mendelian law. Both Weisman and Morgan have postulated the existence of ultimate unit characters (ids or genes) which change spontaneously, as Darwin suggested, and also possibly in small degrees.

The attempt to show that mind had an influence on evolution has not succeeded well. Lamarckianism long disputed with Darwinism for supremacy in the field of biological explanation of variation and progress. The function preceding the structure and use and disuse leaving their effects on the individual and the race are difficult to establish. The *elan vital* imbued with an unconscious desire to develop and chance accessions outlasting the life of the individual and becoming a racial character create so many difficulties that they have not been very ardently defended in biological circles. Nor has Kimer's orthogenetic theory fared better for it endows life with an inborn principle of perfection which is predestined to lift it up to higher and higher levels.

The fact is that life is essentially conservative in its character. As environmental changes have very little or no influence on racial character except when germinal variation is effected at the same time as somatic modification, the acquirement of any trait by individual effort has no effect on the constitution of the next generation. Atavistic regression, filial regression to the type, death of monstrosities and infertility of hybrid forms bring out the essentially tenacious character of the racial endowment. We have no means at our disposal to prove that possibly in the early stage of the world, when conditions of things were more kaleidoscopic than now, changes were more frequent and evolution of new forms more rapid

and that as the universe became more and more stable and by mutual balance and adjustment life-forms got fitted into their social and physical surroundings the pace of evolution slowed down considerably and mutation was replaced by insensible variation. On the contrary, it can be shown definitely that some of the earliest forms of life have remained practically constant, behaving in this respect like living beings totally withdrawn from all struggles for existence. If terrestrial conditions should assume a routinized form, a similar fate might not inconceivably overtake all species of living beings. The continuance of evolution would then demand a perpetual insecurity of vital tenure so that stagnation and degeneration may not overtake living forms and arrest the process of transformation. In other words, life must refuse to lead a well-ordered existence which we demand in the social sphere if it is not to lose the urge that leads it onward in some direction or other. It has again and again been pointed out, for instance, that aquatic animals have evolved infinitely less than land animals presumably because conditions of life vary little in water and in oceans the constant temperature and regular supply of food take away the keenness of struggle and the incentive to variation. The theory of evolution has to take the fact of change in the physical world for granted, for otherwise the problem of the survival of the fittest does not arise. Even if variation be germinal in origin, the evolution of living forms depends upon the preservation of the successful variant and its capacity to leave an issue equally fitted to adapt itself to the conditions of life. It is only in higher forms of life that the capacity to mould the environment to suit the needs of life makes its appearance—possibly, man is the only being who possesses that capacity.

One thing is certain. The older type of belief, based on the Hegelian assumption that the Absolute reaches higher and higher forms of manifestation in course of time in order

to realise itself, must not be interpreted to mean that the lower types are all annulled and superseded before the higher forms are reached. Life has diversified itself in innumerable ways but not injuriously to the existence of lower forms. Some animal and plant forms have indeed disappeared from the face of the earth ; but there is no evidence to show that they were less worthy to survive than those that are still extant. They died out because the conditions of life were not favourable or because they failed to evolve the necessary elements in their constitution to withstand the injurious forces of their physical and biological environment. We are leaving out of consideration the destructive activities of man and other animals for they too are hostile biological factors ; but we have no evidence to show that the mammoth, the dodo, the elk or any such species died out because of the hostility of other species. The primitive races also are dying out under modern conditions of civilisation in spite of care to preserve them by withdrawing them from all struggles of existence. Still, it cannot be laid down as a general rule that the worse has always gone down before the better or that the appearance of the better has been a signal for the departure of the worse from the field of existence. Evolution is not suppression but supersession—the evolution of higher forms has not meant the death of all lower forms, for the struggle for existence is generally confined to species that are nearly allied to each other and that fight with one another round the platter of subsistence. Remote species are interested in different elements of the same environment just as different types of plants absorb different chemicals from the same soil. Hence diversification of phyla and genera and species is quite consistent with the continuance of lower forms side by side with higher forms of life. It would be idle under these conditions to expect the advent of the millenium when the ugly and the weak would entirely disappear and leave the

beautiful and the strong in sole possession of the entire field of nature.

In fact, a far more disturbing factor is the origin and persistence of injurious types of living beings. Many of us would wish the serpent and the crocodile and the pathogenic bacilli and bacteria utter annihilation. Who of us would like to see the microbe gaining upon the genius and killing him in the prime of youth? And yet it is undeniably true that the greatest minds of the world will have to admit defeat at the hands of deadly bacteria and moths will corrupt and worms eat up their noble frames till dust becomes dust and ashes become ashes again. A Carlyle may see in the rotting of leaves the hands of a Divine Providence and an optimist may fondly hope that out of the ruins of mortal frames a race of supermen would arise: but it is only candid to admit that we are in the region of faith when Micawber-like we trust that something will turn up to the advantage of the world at the end. A specimen of this type of argument one will find in Martineau's discussion of the 'triumph of force in history' in his *Study of Religion*: unless one accepts from beforehand the view that nothing can be amiss with the world, one cannot seriously argue that men should not live Tithonus-like but drop off after a certain age—after any age, in fact. It would be difficult to invoke unequivocal biological analogy for this phenomenon. It is well known that Weismann upheld the view that the advent of the next generation is the signal for the earlier generation to die: some plants and animals still follow that salutary prescription of nature and relieve congestion and conflict by dying when they produce their seeds. The life of higher forms, on the other hand, is characterised by the simultaneous existence of earlier and later generations, and the innate craving for temporal persistence can be justified only by supposing that premature death is a calamity and that men have not only

a right but a duty to prolong their existence as much as they can. A variant of this belief which accepts the fact of death with natural piety and yet does not acquiesce in its inevitableness is that men persist or ought to persist in another realm of existence to complete the process of perfection which the cruel hand of death made short here below. It is in this form that the argument meets us in the Kantian system.

But if Evolution has any moral for us at all, it is this, namely, that the individual does not count in the progress of the race and that individuals form the bridge over which the race passes over to the next higher generation. Nietzsche preached that man is only a bridge to the superman and in so far as he fails to usher the superman in, he fails of his purpose. Is it not true that the individuals perish but the race is more and more, so far as biological evolution is concerned? So, far from supporting the craving for individual immortality the lessons of biology are just the reverse: if evolution be true, the individual must be prepared to admit that the entire *raison d'être* of his existence is to contribute to the persistence of the race and possibly also to prepare the way for the next higher race. Have we any reason to think that with man we have reached the last stage of biological evolution? Or shall we subscribe to the contemporary fancy that angelic and other higher natures are emerging out of man through the operation of a *nisus* towards the deity? Or shall we go further and hold that human evolution is proceeding not by chance or spontaneous variation and that just as man has used his ability and intelligence to evolve better species of lower animals by rational selection in alliance with and even in opposition to natural selection, so also invisible spirits are experimenting with human beings and that marriages are literally made in heaven in order that the next generation may be nobler and more worthy in the scale of values?

Unfortunately, again, for any definite conclusion we do

not possess the necessary data. Much has been said of the march of civilisation and the increasing importance of mutual aid as a factor in evolution. (Can it be said, however, that there has been an all-round improvement of human character in course of time and that on the basis of our experience we are in a position to assert definitely that the hand of a moral God is visible in the moulding of the human race? Do we moderns possess the simplicity and honesty of the primitives and is our code of morality so superior to that of savages that we can take pride in our better ethics? Hegel had indeed defended the necessity of sin so that unconscious innocence might be replaced by conscious morality. But have nations and individuals ceased to fight or covet one another's goods? Have swords been beaten into ploughshares, and are lambs and lions lying down together in peace? Has the pacific preaching of different religions borne such good fruit that we can say that we are within sight of an era of mutual toleration and international amity?

Rather we must ruefully confess that intelligence and conduct have not kept equal pace in the march of progress and that biological evolution has taken the form of a disproportionate development of the brain, which is responsible for the growth of intellect much in advance of the moral side of human nature. The effect has been that the discoveries of science have been utilised in furtherance of unholy ends and while the comforts of life have substantially increased, the desire for more amenities of existence has been responsible for strife and oppression. This may be a prelude to a greater understanding in the future; but the most patent fact is that it is impossible to deduce from the past history of the world that struggle would ever end and that not only between the inorganic forces of the world and the world of life but also between the different forms of life and between different individuals and

nations all strife would ultimately cease or that the lower in intellect, beauty and goodness would be finally annihilated and leave the universe to the wise, the beautiful and the good. The chances are rather that all grades would persist as now and that beauty, if any, must be sought in the infinite gradation of the units of being. This would mean that Leibniz's doctrine of continuity, according to which no type is either omitted or duplicated, is a nearer approximation to the true state of things than any other theory of reality that we know of. But if that is so, what is the ultimate objective of the evolutionary process? If evil will continue to be as now, if mutual understanding is to remain limited within each distinct type of living beings and even there without any possibility of firm concord, if the cunning of reason is to operate without the control of morality, and if greatness is destined to be overwhelmed by forces of destruction in all fields, it is risky to affirm that all will ultimately be well with the world and that spirituality is the driving force of the world of life and mind. There is adaptation in many fields, no doubt; but is it designed? Does teleology necessarily imply the pursuit of goodness? Is it the clever or the good that will rule the world at the end? Evolution has no definite answer to these ultimate questions.
